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I. Introduction
F EW AREAS of legal controversy have received as much attention
during the past two decades as that encompassed by the phrase
"free press-fair trial." Various issues are involved, including that of a
newsman's' constitutional right to'maintain the confidentiality of his
sources. The literature and case law in this area are voluminous,2 and
1. The protection, whatever it is, applies equally to newswomen; there is no sexual
exclusivity.
2. "There has been a great deal of writing in recent years on the existence of a
newsman's constitutional right of nondisclosure of confidential information." Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 n.20 (1972) (Burger, C.J.). See 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER
& N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 474-76 (state shield
laws), 503-09 (judicial restrictive orders) (4th ed. 1976). For bibliography, see Jour-
nalist's Privilege Legislation, 28 REc. A. B. CITY N.Y. 547-53 (1973).
For current developments, see PRESS CENSORSHIP NEWSLETTER (PCN) (Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press - a Washington, D.C.-based legal defense and re-
search fund).
With particular reference to the California shield law, see Note, Newsmen's Im-
munity Needs a Shot in the Arm, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 56 (1970); Note, Newsman's
Privilege: A Survey of the Law in California, 4 PAC. L.J. (1973); Note, Newsman's Im-
munity Statute - A Comparison of Legislative Intent to Statutory Form, 8 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 110 (1971); Note, Journalists in the Courts: Toward Effective Shield Legisla-
tion, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 664 (1974); Sturm, Judicial Control of Pretrial and Trial Pub-
licity: A Reexamination of the Applicable Constitutional Standards, 6 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 101 (1975)
Among recent academic writings on the newsman's privilege are the following: D.
GORDON, NEWSMEN'S PRIVILEGE AND THE LAW (Freedom of Information Foundation
Series No. 4, Columbia, Mo., 1974); C. WHALEN, JR., YOUR RIGHT To KNOW (1973)
[hereinafter cited as WHALEN]; THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 10-18, 171-129 (H. Simons
& J. Califano eds. 1976); J. GORA, THE RIGHTS OF REPORTERS 27-70 (1974) [herein-
after cited as GORA]; Wise, Pressures on the Press, in NONE OF YOUR BUSINEsS: GOVERN-
MENT SECRECY IN AMERICA, 217-59 (N. Dorsen & S. Gillers eds. 1974); B. Schmidt,
Jr., Journalists' Privilege: One Year After Branzburg, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
NEWS MEDIA 41-53 (1973) (Final Report - Annual Chief Justice Warren Conference
on Advocacy in the United States); Cades, The Power of the Courts to Protect Journal-
ists' Confidential Sources of Information: An Examination of Proposed Shield Legisla-
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any writer aspiring to make a contribution might well reflect on the
self-restraint of a California jurist who observed: "The legal literature
concerning freedom of the press needs no enrichment by yet another
panegyric. Those who do not believe that a free press is one of the
cornerstones of this republic will not be swayed by us; those who do,
need no refresher."*
During the past year, however, there have been developments that
bring sharply into focus some of the issues and problems involved in
restrictive orders,4 newsmen's shield laws, and subpoenas. In California,
two widely publicized controversies (Farr5 and the Fresno FourO) have
worked their way through the courts, imposing narrow limitations on
the state's otherwise "absolute" shield law.7 A constitutional amend-
ment that would counteract the effect of these two cases has been in-
troduced in the state legislature;" the American Bar Association, over
press opposition, has approved guidelines for issuance of restrictive
orderse (which the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California
tion, 11 HAWAII B.J. 35 (1974); Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qual-
ified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 709 (1975); Goodale, Subpoenas of News
Reporters to Compel Disclosure of Confidential Information: An Analysis of Recent
Legal Developments, 40 L.A. B. BULL. 133 (1974); Barth, Rights in Conflict (1976)
(background paper for Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Justice, Publicity and
the First Amendment); Mursaky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its After-
math, 52 TEX. L. REV. 829 (1974); Rendleman, Free Press-Fair Trial: Review of Silence
Orders, 52 N.C. L. REV. 127 (1973); Note, Newsman's Source Privilege: A Foundation
in Policy for Recognition at Common Law, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 453 (1974); Note, Re-
porter's Privilege - Guardian of the People's Right to Know? 11 N. ENG. L. REV. 405
(1976); Note, Gag Orders on Criminal Defendants, 27 HASTINGs L.J. 1369 (1976);
Note, The Gag Order, Exclusion and the Press's Right to Information, 39 ALB. L. REV.
317 (1975); Note, Prejudicial Publicity in Trials of Public Officials, 85 YALE L.J. 123
(1975); Comment, Gagging the Press in Criminal Trials, 10 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV.
Lm. L. REV. 608 (1975); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege after Branzburg: The
Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 160 (1976); Note, Ungagging the
Press: Expedited Relief from Prior Restraints on News Coverage of Criminal Proceed-
ings, 65 GEO. L.J. 81 (1976); Note, Gag Order Protection for Civil Trials, 64 GEO. L.J.
967 (1976); Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HAnv. J. LEGIs. 233 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Ervin].
3. Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 153, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 235 (1973)
(Kaus, J.).
4. Courts use the terms "order re publicity," "restrictive order," and "protective
order." The press prefers the more pejorative term "gag order," which also fits more
readily into a headline. The leading press trade journal has suggested that newsmen
and editors "watch their language" and restrict the phrase "gag order" to those situations
in which "judges have felt that they have the right to tell the press what it cannot
print ...... Secrecy and Gags, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Feb. 14, 1976, at 4.
5. See notes 109-52 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 162-230 and accompanying text infra.
7. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1977); see note 61 infra.
8. Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 4 (Lewis, R-Riverside, San Bernadino,
with 20 coauthors) Dec. 7, 1976; see note 316 and accompanying text infra.
9. ABA LEGAL ADVISORY Comm. ON FAI TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, RECOMMENDED
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has declined to endorse'o); the Council of Delegates of the State Bar
has adopted a resolution supportive of the Fresno Four"1 - an ac-
tion the journal of the California Judges' Association finds a "little
strange";1 2 and the 1976 U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Nebraska
Press Association" case has significant implications in this area.
This article examines the effect of these developments on the Cali-
fornia newsmen's shield law (contained in Evidence Code section
1070). It begins by discussing the historical context in which the shield
law emerged. Using this background, the article examines the meaning
and scope of the protection contained in section 1070. The article then
discusses the decisions in Farr and the Fresno Four, noting the way
in which they have restricted the protection in the shield law. The
article concludes with a survey of the proposals that have been ad-
vanced to balance the conflict between a free press and a fair trial.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
American journalists have a long history of protecting the confi-
dentiality of news sources. Chief Justice Burger has observed that the
issues raised in the Nebraska Press Association case "are almost as
old as the Republic."14 Actually they are older. In 1722, Benjamin
Franklin's half-brother, James, was sent to jail for a'month for refusing
to name the author of an article in his newspaper, the New England
Courant.'5
The nation's first shield law was adopted in Maryland in 1896.1"
COURT PROCEDURES To ACCOMMODATE RIGHTS OF FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ABA COURT PROCEDURES].
10. The Recorder (San Francisco), April 15, 1977, at 1, col. 5. See also Dep't of
Communications and Public Affairs, State Bar of California News Release, April 15,
1977. See notes 298-300 and accompanying text infra.
11. Transcript of proceedings of 42d annual meeting of the House of Delegates,
State Bar of California, at 281-301 (Sept. 18, 1976). See discussion in text accompany-
ing note 228 infra.
12. Gag Orders, CAL. CTS. COMMENTARY, Jan. 1977, at 2.
13. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
14. Id. at 547.
15. The article suggested that the authorities were somewhat sluggish in suppressing
piracy off of the Massachusetts coast. Benjamin, a 15-year-old apprentice on the news-
paper, was called to testify but parried the questions more successfully, was admonished
and released. B. FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN at 69 (1964).
For a discussion of early shield law cases, see WHALEN, supra at note 2 and Ervin,
supra at note 2.
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1957) Replacement (1971). The Maryland statute
"stands almost alone in regard to the ease and amity which marked its approval." See
Gordon, The 1896 Maryland Shield Law, 22 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS 1, 36 (1972).
Six years earlier, in 1890, a privilege bill had been rejected in the Iowa legislature,
and in 1896 the legislature of the new state of Utah also rejected a proposal to grant
journalists an evidentiary privilege. Id.
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Three years later, a California court issued what is said to have been
the first "gag" order in the country." In that case, a San.Jose judge
not only closed a divorce proceeding (which he had statutory authority
to do) but when advised that the evidence would be of a "filthy na-
ture" ordered "no public report or publication of any character of the
testimony."" Editor Shortridge of the San Jose News violated the order
and was held in contempt. However, the state supreme court ruled that
the order was unconstitutional.o 
The year after the Maryland statute was adopted the first attempt
was made in California to invoke a claim of evidentiary privilege based
on a conversation with a news reporter. In that case, People v. Dur-
rant,20 the state supreme court denied the claim, remarking that it
"scarcely merits comment."2 ' This was not, however, a typical news-
men's shield law case, in that the claim of privilege was invoked by a
party other than a journalist. Durrant, one of California's most noted
murder trials ,22 is of historic interest on another related ground - it
resulted in the first contempt conviction of a representative of the mass
media (though not of the press). During the trial, a stock company at
the Alcazar Theater attempted to produce a "great moral drama" en-
titled "The Crime of the Century or the Demon in the Belfry," based
on the Durrant case. A court order was issued, and law enforcement
officials halted the play at the close of the first act. The theater manager
spent three days in jail for violating the court order. The state supreme
court later held the order to be unconstitutional. 2 3
Within a matter of days after handing down its decision in Durrant,
the California Supreme Court again considered the issue of newsmen's
privilege on a writ of habeas corpus filed by two San Francisco Exam-
iner reporters held in contempt by the State Senate for refusing to
reveal the sources of an article charging some Senators with receiving
bribes. The court discharged the writ and remanded the prisoners to
the custody of the Sacramento County Sheriff, commenting: "It cannot
17. In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 P. 227 (1893). See Friendly, A Crime and Its
Aftermath, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1976, §§ 6, 19, 92 (Magazine).
18. 99 Cal. at 526, 34 P. at 227.
19. Id. at 528, 34 P. at 228.
20. 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75 (1897).
21. Id. at 220, 48 P. at 86.
22. "[Tlhe Durrant case, as it furiously contested . . . for the title of 'Crime of the
Century,' developed 'a sufficient aura of ambiguity to place it firmly among America's
lambent lethal legends." Boucher, The Legends, in SAN FRANCISCO MURDERS 83 (J.
Jackson ed. 1937). The case is treated in detail in H. WIGMORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL
PRoF 691 (2d ed. 1931).
23. Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 44 P. 458 (1896).
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be successfully contended, and has not been seriously argued, that the
witnesses were justified in refusing to give the names upon the grounds
that the communications were privileged."24 In its decisions, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was merely following existing common law,
which had refused to recognize such a privilege in the absence of a
statute.2 5
When the Maryland statute was enacted in 1896, such legislation
was not regarded favorably in most legal circles. A New York attorney
wrote at the time: "In Maryland, they have a statute making the most
irresponsible tramp reporter a privileged person in the matter of com-
munications, the same as doctors and lawyers." 20 In 1923, John Henry
Wigmore forecast (erroneously it turned out) that: "The [Maryland]
enactment, as detestable in substance as it is in form, will probably
remain unique."2 7
After Maryland, no more states adopted shield laws until the 1930's
when New Jersey (1933), Alabama (1935), California (1935), Ar-
kansas (1936), Kentucky (1936), Arizona (1937) and Pennsylvania
(1937) enacted statutes.28 These states were followed in the 1940's by
Indiana (1941), Montana (1943), and Michigan (1949) .20 Ohio fol-
lowed suit in 1953.30 There was then a gap of more than ten years,
Lousiana (1964) being the first in the next series of enactments that
included Alaska, New Mexico and Nevada (all.in 1967) .31 Then in
the 1970's came New York (1970), Illinois (1971), and Rhode Island
(1971).32
The great increase in newsmen's subpoenas during the early 1970's,
the Branzburg decision,-' and the incarceration of such newsmen as
24. Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 300, 48 P. 124, 125 (1897). On a subse-
quent application to a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus the court declined
review. 80 F. 99 (N.D. Cal. 1897).
25. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (3d ed. 1961). Wigmore lists a number of
professions (such as banker, broker, and accountant) members of which along with jour-
nalists could not claim that communications were privileged in the absence of a statute.
Id. at 529-30.
26. Garnsey, The Demand for Sensational Journals, 18 THE ARENA 681, 683 (1897).
27. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (1923).
28. For compilation of state code citations see Comment, The Newsman's Privilege






33. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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William Farr3 4 and Peter Bridge" stimulated state legislation. Six
shield laws were adopted during 1973 in Delaware, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Minnesota, Oregon, and Tennessee. The passage of a shield
law in Oklahoma in 1974 brought the total number of states with such
statutes to twenty-six.36 During the summer of 1976, however, the New
Mexico Supreme Court declared that the state's shield law was an un-
constitutional encroachment on the authority of the court.37 The New
Mexico shield law was a casualty of a defamation action in which
representatives of a broadcast station appealed from an order requiring
them to disclose the identity of confidential sources and to produce
notes and tapes.
It was the procedural aspect of the statute which the New Mexico
court found invalid. The statute granted a newsmen's privilege against
testifying unless disclosure was determined to be "essential to prevent
injustice."3 8 In the event of a disclosure order, the statute provided for
a de novo hearing by the state supreme court and fixed the time within
which an appeal must be heard by the court. The state supreme court
held unanimously that under the New Mexico state constitution the
authority to prescribe the rules of evidence and procedure was vested
exclusively in the judiciary. Statutes purporting to regulate practice
34. See text accompanying note 128 infra, for an account of Farr's 46-day incar-
ceration.
35. Peter J. Bridge was a New Jersey reporter who became the first newsman to be
imprisoned following the Branzburg decision. After 22 days in jail he was released on
October 24, 1972. See In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972); Bridge,
Absolute Immunity, Absolutely, THE QUILL, Jan. 1973, at 3.
36. See Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Fed-
eral Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 160, 167 n.41 (1976) (compilation of state code
citations); see also Comment, 49 TUL. L. REV. 417, 429 n.100 (1975) (compilation of
all state code citations except Oklahoma); GORA, supra note 2, at 243-58 (appendix
summarizing 25 statutes); PRESS CENSORSHIP NEWSLETTER (Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press), Jul.-Aug. 1973, at 609 (summary and analysis of all state code
citations except Delaware and Oklahoma); The Council of State Governments, Shield
Laws (1973) (concise comparative treatment of 25 shield law statutes); Zafren, Testi-
monial Privilege for Representatives of the News Media (Congressional Reference Serv-
ice, Library of Congress, Nov. 14, 1972) (comparison of 18 shield law statutes); see
also Newsman's Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 257-92 (1973) (statement of Arthur B.
Hanson, General Counsel of the American Newspaper Publishers Association) [herein-
after cited as 1973 House Hearings]; Newsman's Privilege: Hearings on S. 36, S. 158,
S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S. 750, S. 870, S. 913, S. 1128 and S.J. 8 Before Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 723-51
(1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Senate Hearings].
37. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
38. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1(c).
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and procedure in the court proceedings therefore violated the state
constitution and could not be binding in the courts.39
With the retreat by New Mexico, the number of state shield laws
in August of 1977 stood at twenty-five.40
III. CALIFORNIA'S SHIELD LAW
A. Legislative History
The enactment of shield laws during the mid-1930's by seven states,
including California, was in part a response to a series of incidents
between 1929 and 1935 in which five reporters were jailed for con-
tempt. These contempt cases generated considerable national interest
and served as an impetus for protective state legislation.41
In 1935, California added news reporters to section 1881 of its
Code of Civil Procedure, which provided that certain persons (attor-
neys, physicians, spouses, clergymen, and public officials) could not
be compelled to testify about their confidential relationships.4" The
1935 enactment was amended in 1961 when the limited immunity was
extended to radio and television newsmen, press associations, and wire
services. 4 3 It is significant to note that the protection covered only the
source of information which was actually published in a newspaper or
used for the purpose of news or news commentary on radio or televi-
sion. Furthermore, the statute did not create a privilege to refuse to
testify as to the protected information but was merely an immunity
from being adjudged in contempt."
39. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354.
40. No attempt will be made during the 1977 legislative session to enact a new
shield law. There "was not a strong enough majority" for such legislation among mem-
bers of the press and broadcasters' organization, the preference being to "stick by the
first amendment." Telephone interview with Ward Ballmer, Executive Secretary of the
New Mexico Press Association, in Grants, New Mexico (Feb. 10, 1977).
41. See Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Dmulging the Source of His
Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61 (1950) for account of the five cases. Probably the best
known was that involving Martin Mooney, a reporter for the N.Y. Journal American,
who refused to disclose the source of information on which he based a gambling expos6
and was jailed for 30 days. People ex. rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E.
415 (1936).
42. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1881(6) (1935) (current version at CAL. EVID. CODE
4 1070 (West Supp. 1977)). This section provided that: "A publisher, editor, reporter
or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper cannot be\adjudged in
contempt by a court, the legislature, or any administrative body, for refusing to dis-
close the source of any information procured for publication and published in a news-
paper."
43. 1961 Cal. Stats. ch. 629 at 1798.
44. See notation by the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary, in California an-
notated code in CAL. Evn. CODE § 1070 (West 1965).
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A crucial battle ensued in 1965 when the California Law Revision
Commission, in drafting a new Evidence Code, proposed several limi-
tations to the press immunity statute.4  After a seven-year study, the
Commission had rejected various arguments in support of a journalists'
absolute protection, recommending instead a discretionary privilege
more closely analogous to the protection provided government in-
formers. The privilege would be available unless a judge found that the
source had been previously disclosed or that disclosure was required
in the public interest.46
As a result of vigorous protests by media spokesmen in Senate
Judiciary Committee hearings,47 the Committee unanimously rewrote
the legislation to restore the immunity. Section 1881(6) of the Code
of Civil Procedure was repealed and re-enacted without change as
Evidence Code Section 1070.48
In 1971, the statute was again broadened: (a) to provide pro-
tection for newsmen so employed at the time the news was procured,
not just at the time the immunity was invoked,4 ' and (b) to protect
the source not only of published material, but the source of any infor-
mation procured for publication. "0 In 1972, an amendment was adopted
which made it clear that the immunity extended to proceedings of local
investigative agencies and grand juries by adding the language "any
other body having the power to issue subpoenas ... in any proceeding
as defined in section 901."' Although it had been widely assumed that
the shield law protected news reporters from grand jury subpoenas,
the 1972 amendment clarified the scope of the legislative protection.
Thus the distinction has consequences for the journalist-litigant who faces sanctions
other than contempt, for example a default judgment in a libel suit for refusing to
testify. See text accompanying notes 88-99 infra.
45. A California Privilege Not Covered by the Uniform Rules - Newsmen's Privi-
lege, 6 CAL. L. REVISION CoMm. 481 (1964).
46. Id. at 507-08.
47. S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 17, 1965, at 8, col. 2.
48. 1965 Cal. Stats. ch. 299 at 1297.
49. 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1717 at 3658. The 1971 amendment was in part due to
dicta in a case involving William Farr, who, as an ex-newsman, had been held by a
trial judge to be unprotected by the state's shield law. While deciding the case against
Farr on other grounds, the court observed that section 1070 "read strictly does not in-
clude petitioner within the scope of its immunity." Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App.
3d 60, 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972). See note
118 infra.
50. 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1717 at 3658.
51. 1972 Cal. Stats. ch. 1431 at 3126. Section 901 defines "proceedings" as any ac-
tion authorized pursuant to which testimony can be compelled. CAL. EVID. CODE § 901
(West 1965). Also, in the amendment, the words "judicial, legislative" were substituted
for the more restrictive "a court, the legislature." Application to administrative bodies
remained the same.
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During the 1973 California legislative session, in reaction both to
the U.S. Supreme Court's "invitation" in the Branzburg case to Con-
gress and the states to legislate in this area,5 2 and to the jailing of news-
men William Farr,5 3 Peter Bridge,54 and John Lawrence,5 5 several
bills and two constitutional amendments were introduced.so The prin-
cipal issue raised by the proposed legislation was whether protection
should be extended not only to information procured for publication
but also to "unpublished information," such as background material,
including a reporter's notes, tapes, photographs, and television "out-
takes." The Judiciary Committee of the Assembly held a series of hear-
ings but failed to reach sufficient agreement for any single bill to
emerge.
A new attempt was launched in March, 1974, with the introduc-
tion of S. 1858.57 The bill, which had fourteen co-authors, was more
52. 408 U.S. at 706. Detailed consideration of federal legislation is not within the
scope of this article. On the federal level, newsmen's privilege bills have been intro-
duced into Congress at least as far back as 1929. See Ervin, supra note 2 and WHALEN,
supra note 2. In the 93rd Congress, in the wake of Branzburg more than 40 bills were
introduced, but none was passed. A major factor was the inability of news organiza-
tions to agree on the type of legislation they wanted. Interview with Sen. Alan Cranston,
in San Francisco (Feb. 5, 1977).
For discussion of the case against federal legislation, see WHALEN, supra note 2, at
147-66; O'Neil, Shield Laws: Partial Solution to a Pervasive Problem, 20 N.Y. L. Forum
515, 518-31 (1975); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case
for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 160 (1976); Graham & Landau, The
Federal Shield -Law We Need, 11 COLUM. JOURNALIsM REV. 26 (1976). See also the
Department of Justice guidelines originally adopted in 1970 regulating requests for
subpoenas and requiring exhaustion of other sources and specific approval of the At-
torney General before issuing subpoenas to the news media. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1975).
A Department, of Justice report shows that Attorney General Edward Levi, between
May 1975 and November 1976, approved 42 requests for subpoenas for newsmen. In
36 cases reporters testified or produced the information willingly. 42 News Subpoenas
Approved by Levi, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 20, 1977, at 31.
53. For discussion of the Farr case and its implications, see text accompanying notes
109-52 infra.
54. See supra note 35.
55. Lawrence, Washington bureau chief of the L.A. Times, was jailed for refusing
to produce, in response to a subpoena, papers, transcripts and documents relating to an
interview by Times reporters with Alfred C. Baldwin, III, a key government witness in
the Watergate prosecutions. Lawrence was behind bars for two and a half hours, being
released after Baldwin, aware that the tapes contained nothing of substance beyond
what had already been published, requested the newspaper to give up the tapes, and
it complied. See U.S. v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In ordering the Times
to turn over the tapes, Judge Leventhal, in a concurring opinion, suggested an in camera
examination of the material and application of the tests of relevancy and alternate
sources. Id. See also Lawrence, Going to Jail Over Watergate Tapes, BULL. AM. Soc'Y
NEWSPAPER EDITORs, Feb. 1973, at 6.
56. The bills were A.B. 1, A.B. 4, A.B. 26, A.B. 75; the constitutional amendments
were Assembly Constitutional Amendment 2 and Assembly Constitutional Amendment 9.
57. S. 1858 1973-74 Regular Session (1974).
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simplified in approach than previous efforts and was "easier to explain
to non-lawyer legislators.""8 The opponents of S. 1858 argued that it
was "too broad" and was a "blatant withdrawal of information from the
judicial process."59
The media's argument in support of protecting "unpublished in-
formation" focused on the fact that a reporter is often given informa-
tion purely as background to aid in his understanding of a subject.
Investigative reporters conducting in-depth research on a story may
actually use only a fraction of the material which they have gathered.
In addition, at the time that the information is sought it is often difficult
for a reporter to know whether or not the information will be pub-
lished; and if his information is not published, the source would not be
protected.
Shield law proponents also maintained that if prosecutors are able
to obtain and utilize the "work product" of reporters, the media will
soon become identified with law enforcement, thereby jeopardizing
rapport with certain sources, particularly those with dissident and
radical points of view. Shield laws play an important role in assist-
ing the news media to maintain an air of independence, since extensive
compliance with subpoenas would place the press in the role of an
"investigative arm of the government."oo
The bill cleared the State Senate by a vote of thirty-one to one, but
encountered stiff opposition in the Assembly Judiciary Committee
(which finally approved it by a narrow margin). On the Assembly
floor it cleared by a vote of fifty-one to sixteen, and Governor Reagan
signed the bill into law on September 26, 1974.61
58. Interview with Michael B. Dorais, Sacramento legal counsel, California News-
paper Publishers Association, in San Francisco (Dec. 6, 1976).
59. L.A. Times, June 12, 1974 § 1, at 33, col. 1.
60. See, e.g., 1973 Senate Hearings supra note 36 at 186 n.571 (statement of An-
thony Amsterdam, Stanford University Law School).
61. The final version of the statute, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1977),
reads:
(a) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed
upon a newspaper, magazine, or, other periodical publication, or by a press association
or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or employed, cannot be ad-
judged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other body
having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose, in any proceeding as de-
fined in Section 901, the source of any information procured while so connected or
employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or
for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering,
receiving or processing of info'rmation for communication to the public.
(b) Nor can a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with
or employed by a radio or television station, or any person who has been so connected
or employed, be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose the source of any
information procured while so connected or employed for news or news commentary
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The enactment of S. 1858 culminated a "20-month struggle" and
gave California what was termed "the strongest press shield law in the
nation" by the California Newspaper Publishers Association, principal
sponsor of the 1974 amendments.62 However, the statute was to re-
ceive judicial interpretation that would impose narrow limitations on
the "absolute" privilege conferred by the legislature.63
B. Scope and Interpretation
Material protected: The California shield law protects the sources
of information "procured" by a newsman while he is connected with or
employed by the news media as well as any "unpublished information"
obtained or prepared by a newsman in his capacity of "gathering, re-
ceiving or processing" information for communication to the public.
The California law would not appear to cover a reporter who, during
the lunch hour, witnessed a bank robbery or who at night in a private
home witnessed a brawl; the word "procured" could be interpreted to
require some sort of initiative or affirmative effort upon the part of the
newsman. In contrast to the language of the original California law
and to most other state legislation, the information which was gathered
need be neither "published" nor "confidential." The California shield
law is designed to protect all information from the reach of the
subpoena, whether it is published or unpublished.
The broad language used to define "unpublished information" also
seems to resolve the question of who owns or controls a reporter's
notes and tape recordings. It is the position of most news media man-
agers that notes and tape recordings made by newsmen-employees
belong to the management, which has the sole authority to decide
whether to turn the notes over to a court, even if the action would
reports on radio or television, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information
obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communi-
cation to the public.
(c) As used in this section, "unpublished information" includes information
not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought, whether
or not related information has been disseminated and includes, but is not limited to,
all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself dissem-
inated to the public through a medium of communication, whether or not published
information based upon or related to such material has been disseminated.
62. EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Dec. 14, 1974, at 7 (Letter to the Editor from Mr. Dorais).
One commentator observed: "The California legislators' 1974 amendment . . . filled
every imagined loophole in the protection of the press so that the ingenuity of judges
and government bodies would no longer defeat their protective intent." Note, Search
and Seizure and the Media, 28 STAN. L. REv. 957, 964 n.41 (1976).
63. See discussion of Farr v. Superior Court in text accompanying note 120 infra.
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disclose a reporter's confidential source.14 The California statute is
not specific on this question but appears to invest authority in the
reporter to withhold at least those notes, photographs and tapes which
are his "work product" and in his possession."5
Persons protected: In the various state statutes, three techniques
have been used to describe the protected group: a) defining the re-
lationship between the person protected and the media; b) listing the
various media themselves, and c) requiring, in both the definition
and listing, that the relationship be "regular" or the medium be
"legitimate."
The California statute is of the first category, protecting:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or em-
ployed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publica-
tion, or by a press association or wire service or any person who
has been so connected or employed . . . (or) a radio or television
news reporter or other person connected with or employed by a
radio or television station, or any person who has been so connected
or employed ... 66
The California statutory term "other person connected with or
employed by" arguably would encompass every low-level employee
of a newspaper, but would exclude the self-employed news gatherer
or free-lance reporter unless, prior to the undertaking, he had estab-
lished some sort of "connection" with the media. Thus, it might not
protect the author of a book, a pamphleteer, or such free-lance re-
porters as Seymour M. Hersh, whose expose of My Lai won the 1970
Pulitzer prize for International Reporting."-
The parameters of the definition of "newspaper" in the California
shield law are open to question. A narrow interpretation could rely,
for example, on the only definition of "newspaper" found in California
codes, which requires publication at regular intervals, a bona fide list
of paying subscribers, establishment for at least one year, and dis-
64. They argue a strict "property theory" that the material was obtained during
the course of employment. See PRESS CENSORSHIP NEWSLETTER (Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press), Nov.-Dec. 1973, at 38. The Reporters Committee suggests
that, at a minimum, disclosure of a confidential source in notes should be a joint privi-
lege of the reporter and media owners. Id.
65. The decision as to what notes to take, in what form, and how detailed is left
to the individual reporter.
66. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1977). By comparison, for example, the
Oregon statute enacted in 1973 protects any person "connected with, employed by or
engaged in any. medium of communication to the public" and covers both books and
pamphlets. OR. REv. STAT. § 44.520 (1973).
67. How tenuous is the phrase "connected with or employed by"? Would the statute
protect the informant or paid tipster?,
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semination of "local or telegraphic news and intelligence of a general
character. . . ."6s To limit shield law protection only to "newspapers
of general circulation" could exclude the student, minority and under-
ground press - publications that would be easy prey for subpoenas
if not protected. Such a restrictive intepretation would arguably con-
stitute discrimination on the basis of news content and conceivably
be an unconstitutional denial of first and fourteenth amendment rights.
The United States Supreme Court noted in Branzburg v. Hayesco that
the first amendment ordinarily prohibits courts from inquiring into the
content of expression (except in obscenity and libel) and that "afford-
ing a privilege to some organs of communications but not to others
would inevitably be discriminating on the basis of content."70 The use
of a dictionary definition of "newspaper," however, would expand im-
munity to publications that met two basic tests - distribution at
regular, usually relatively short, intervals, and publication of material
regarded as of current interest.
The terms "magazine" and "periodical publication" are undefined.
The frequency of publication required is an open question, and the
case of an annual publication or one issued irregularly is particularly
difficult.
The terms "press association and wire service" and "radio or tele-
vision station" are less ambiguo'us, but it is questionable whether news-
reels, 7 ' "ham" radios, and cable television are protected. Apparently
a documentary film would be protected if shown on television, but
not if shown in a motion picture theater.
The California shield law does not immunize individual authors
writing for publication in book form. Such outstanding examples of
investigative reporting as Alfred McCoy's The Politics of Heroin in
Southeast Asia7 2 would not be protected, thus short-circuiting the ra-
tionale that the privilege is based on the public interest in the in-
formation disseminated.
Those who argue for the broadest definition present a strong his-
torical and constitutional case that the first amendment was written
"against a background, not of multinational communications and great
68. CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 6000-08 (West 1966) establish criteria for qualification
of a newspaper for purposes of official advertising.
69. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
70. Id. at 705 n.40.
71. Specifically mentioned in ALAsKA STAT. § 09.25.220 (1967).
72. A. McCoy, C. READ & L. ADAMs III, THE PoLITics OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST
AsIA (1972).
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news empires, but of individual letter writers, Committees of Corres-
pondence and citizen pamphleteers."7 However, an argument against
absolute protection would caution that such immunity could invite
"sham" reporters to take advantage of the law; in fact, the U.S. Supreme
Court in a footnote to Branzburg explained that a first amendment
claim might be made by groups who set up newspapers in order to
engage in criminal activity and therefore be immune from the grand
jury.4
Waiver: The California statute does not mandate the loss of the
privilege once the informant consents to disclosure." By contrast, a
recently enacted Oregon statute" explicitly provides that if the in-
formant offers himself as a witness he impliedly consents to the exam-
ination of those persons otherwise protected by the privilege.7" The
Oregon provision places control of the privilege with the informant,
although the media might prefer to resist a subpoena, feeling that it
may be seen as "an investigative arm of the government."
The only California case addressing the issue of waiver implied
that voluntary disclosure by the source would constitute a waiver, al-
though no waiver was found on the facts of the case itself.78 Several
cases from other jurisdictions have held that the newsmen's privilege
runs only to the reporter and may be waived regardless of the wishes
of an informant."
A further question is whether identification of the source of pub-
lished material would defeat a claim of privilege for "unpublished in-
formation" or constitute a waiver of the immunity granted by the
statute. It would seem that it would not; but in a case involving Will
Lewis, manager of a radio station in Los Angeles, the superior court
held that in broadcasting a brief news item about the receipt of a
73. Graham & Landau, The Federal Shield Law We Need, 11 COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. 26, 28 (1976). The historical validity of a broad definition for members of the
press was noted by Justice White in Branzburg: "[Tihe liberty of the press is the right
of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph ...... 408 U.S.
at 704.
74. Id. at 705 n.40.
75. For example, John Lawrence (see supra note 51) released subpoenaed informa-
tion after the informant had approved. Under California law, would the reporter he
able to retain his immunity and continue to refuse to testify?
76. OR. REV. STAT. § 44-530 (1973).
77. Id. Some state statutes set forth specific circumstances in which a waiver of
privilege can occur. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-29(b) (West 1976) (disclosure
of "any part of the privileged matter"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.385 (1973)' (disclosure
of "any significant part of the matter").
78. In re Howard, 136 Cal. App. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (1955).
79. See 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 36, at 730.
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Symbionese Liberation Army communique, Lewis had waived the "un-
published information" immunity. He refused to surrender the original
of the document and was held in contempt. Lewis ultimately turned
over the document to purge himself of contempt charges.8 0
Proceedings covered: As indicated above,"' the California shield
law was amended in 1972 to provide protection from "any . . . body
having the power to issue subpoenas. ... " However, the state shield
law is not a bar to contempt citations arising out of federal criminal
and civil proceedings8 3 (although there may be an exception in civil
diversity cases ).84
The question has also arisen as to whether Evidence Code section
1070 affords protection in a "search and seizure" situation. The statute
appears to apply if contempt citations may issue from one of the bodies
with subpoena power when a member of the press refuses to disclose
information. The argument has been made that since the underlying
policy of such a statute is to erect a barrier between the press and
governmental agencies, it should "immunize the media from producing
evidence at the behest of police executing warrants as well as at the
command of other government agencies issuing subpoenas."8 5 Recom-
mendations have been made that the legislatures remove any am-
biguity from shield laws by explicitly extending the protection to
seizures.8
On four occasions in 1973, California law enforcement agencies
employed search warrants to enter media offices and remove informa-
tion. This activity was interpreted by the Reporters' Committee for
80. PRESS CENSORSHIP NEWSLETTER (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press),
Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 37-38.
81. See text accompanying note 151 supra.
82. 1972 Cal. Stats. ch. 1431 at 3126.
83. See FED. R. EVID. 501. See also, In re Lewis, 377 F. Supp. 297, 301 (C.D. Cal.
1974); In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nom.
Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972); Apicella v. McNeil Labora-
tories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
84. See Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), in which a Look
magazine article Cepeda claimed was defamatory was written in New York and the
author's deposition taken in New York. The trial was held in California, and the court
ruled that California law would apply. At that time the California shield law did not
extend to magazines and the Look writer was held not to possess a privilege under Cali-
fornia law.
85. Note, Search and Seizure of the Media, 28 STAN. L. REV. 957, 970 (1976). See
also Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977) af'g 353 F. Supp. 124
(N.D. Cal., 1972) (police search illegal, newspaper awarded $50,000 in attorney fees,
civil rights laws cited).
86. Note, Search and Seizure of the Media, 28 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1976).
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Freedom of the Press as an effective method to circumvent the state's
shield law."'
In meritorious defamation cases, where the issue is the truth of the
material published by a defendant-newsman, the difficulty of accom-
modating the two competing principles (protection of source versus
ascertainment of the truth of the material) can be intense; and the
newsman generally has been required to reveal his sohrce if such dis-
closure goes to the "heart of the plaintiff's case." This was the test ap-
plied in the 1958 case of Garland v. Torre,"" and most courts deciding
libel cases since Branzburg v. Hayes" in 1972 have looked to this case
as well as to Branzburg as a source of authority. 0o
Under New York Times v. Sullivano' and its progeny 9 2 to succeed
in a libel action a public official or public figure plaintiff must prove
a defendant's knowledge of falsity or his reckless disregard for the
truth. Concern has been expressed that recognition of a journalist's
privilege in defamation actions "could effectively make impossible"
the recovery of libel judgments.o3 To avoid this result, at least three
state statutes94 and several bills that have been introduced in Con-
gress" provide that the testimonial privilege shall not apply in a civil
action for defamation.
The California shield law is silent on this issue - but, as noted,96
the fact that it grants an immunity rather than a privilege would ap-
parently not prevent the use of other sanctions to compel a party-
87. PRESS CENSORSHIP NEWSLETTER (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press), Dec.-Jan. 1973-74.
88. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
89. 408 U.S. 665.
90. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for News-
men, 26 HASTINGS L. REV. 709, 737 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Goodale].
91. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
92. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); and Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
93. 1973 House Hearings, see supra note 36 (statement of Prof. B. C. Schmidt).
94. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 385.3 (West. Supp. 1977) and ORE. REV. STAT. §
44.530(3) (1975) both provide that the shield law "does not apply with respect to the
content or source of allegedly defamatory information, in civil action for defamation
wherein the defendant asserts, a defense based on the content or source of such infor-
mation." Illinois provides that the privilege "is not available in any libel or slander ac-
tion in which a reporter or news medium is a party defendant." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51
§ 111 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
95. For example, S. 451, S. 750, H.R. 2230. See texts of 55 bills introduced in the
93rd Cong., collected in app. B, 1973 House Hearings, supra note 36 at 585-754. Most
of the proposed legislation provided that a reporter-defendant need testify only if the
plaintiff demonstrated that the information sought would lead to "persuasive evidence
on the issue of malice," or similar "heart of the matter" language.
96. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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reporter to comply with discovery requirements in a civil proceeding.
In libel cases the defendant has the burden of proving his defense; if
the confidential source is needed to prove truth, good faith, or lack of
negligence or recklessness, the defendant can either reveal the source
or risk loss of the case.
The blanket exemption in some statutes seems to offer an oppor-
tunity for filing a frivolous or specious defamation action to force a
newsman to waive the privilege. 7 More desirable is the protection pro-
vided by the post-Branzburg cases which hold that the plaintiff is
required to show the likely value of evidence to be obtained by the
subpoena.98 This issue came before the California Court of Appeal in
a proceeding peripheral to newsman William Farr's contempt case.e9
California's Evidence Code section 1070 and most other state shield
laws do not provide protection for the routine "authentication" sub-
poena. Strictly interpreted, the California statute protects only sources
of published material and "unpublished information," as defined.100
What about published information not based on confidential sources?
What harm can a newsman do to the functioning of a free press if he
takes the stand under such circumstances? - usually a civil action in
which he is asked to testify (a) if he wrote the story and (b) if he
believes it is true, or did so believe at the time he wrote it.
In many state shield laws (and in those states without such a
statute) a newsman's notes are not protected. If notes can be subpoe-
naed, it becomes quite difficult to limit responses to two simple state-
ments: Yes, I wrote it; yes, I believed it true. The next question con-
ceivably would be, "What about this material. in your notes? Why
wasn't it included? Is it also true?" etc.
When newsmen are issued an "authentication" subpoena the tend-
ency is to comply, especially in the case of smaller newspapers, since
97. The possibility of providing :'for displeased public figures to harass the news
media, and to smoke out their confidential sources for non-judicial purposes also has
been noted." 1973 House Hearings, supra note 36, at 575-76 (statement of Radio-Tele-
vision News Directors Ass'n).
98. See Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 474 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973). Cf. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 938 (1974).
99. See Superior Court Judge Robert Weil's order requiring Los Angeles newsman
William Farr to testify in a libel suit. Kanarek v. Farr, No. 71034 (Superior Court of
Los Angeles County Dec. 31, 1976). The order was appealed, but the Second District
Court of Appeal refused to set it aside. Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, Kanarek
and Fitzgerald, real parties in interest, No. 50996 (2d D. Ct. App. July 28, 1977), Farr
v. Superior Court, No. 50377 (2d D. Ct. App. July 28, 1977). See infra notes 158-61
and accompanying text.
100. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1977).
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it may be too costly to hire an attorney to move to quash the subpoena.
Also the reporter will often lose time, which a newspaper may feel it
cannot afford.
In the "authentication" subpoena (with or with6ut a state shield
law protection) the reporter has two courses of action. He can refuse
to comply and risk contempt charges and jail, or he can argue a quali-
fled privilege based on the "limited nature" of Branzburg.'0 That case
did not deal with the issue of authentication, but it did leave the door
open to finding that the first amendment gives some protection to news-
men and their confidential sources. Justice Powell, in his Branzburg
concurrence commented that "if a newsman is called upon to give
information bearing only remote and tenuous relationship to the sub-
ject of the investigation . . ." he is not without a remedy.1 0 2 Since
Branzburg there have been a significant number of federal and state
cases in which a qualified privilege has been recognized. 03
In the Fresno Four case,' 04 both the majority and dissent supported
a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation of Evidence Code section
1070. The court considered the three-prong Branzburg test, and held
that "relevancy" and "compelling" need had been satisfied and that the
Supreme Court had not required "exhaustion of alternate sources." 0 5
The qualified privilege has been summarized by the Court of Ap-
peal for the Ninth Circuit with the observation that the U.S. Supreme
Court in Branzburg "appears to have fashioned at least a partial first
amendment shield available to newsmen who are subjected to various
101. 408 U.S. 665.
102. Id. at 710. A newsman faced with this situation, Justice Powell says, "will have
access to the court on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be
entered." Id.
103. Among leading federal cases are United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373
(4th Cir. 1976) and Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (1976). In
Steelhammer two reporters were called to testify whether coal miners had encouraged
or participated in wildcat strikes. The court of appeals vacated the contempt citations
of the newsmen, holding that there were alternate sources and no need for the subpoena.
Significantly, the court remarked that its "conclusion does not accord a privilege, abso-
lute or qualified, to the reporter. Actually it is a privilege of the public." 539 F.2d at
375. In Gilbert, a civil action for damages allegedly suffered from contact with the
chemical kepone, the court held that the first amendment provides a protection "that
may be abrogated only in rare and compelling circumstances." 411 F. Supp. at 508.
See also Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 966 (1973); and Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C.
1973). Leading state cases recognizing a qualified privilege are: Brown v. Common-
wealth, 214 Va. 775, 204 S.E.2d 429 (1974); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d
254 (1974); People v. Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.3d.685 (Sup. Ct. 1975);
Morgan v. State, 337 So.2d 951 (Fla. 1976).
104. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 217-18, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45.
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demands to divulge the source of confidentially secured information"
and that this opinion "appears to teach [sic] broadly enough to be ap-
plied to other civil and criminal proceedings as well. Recent cases have
so held."O6
The authentication subpoena does not involve confidential sources
and appears not to be protected by a strict reading of the California
shield law. However, the three-fold qualified privilege test is available
to oppose any subpoenas that are remote or tenuous. Such proceedings
put the newsman in the awkward position of being "used" by another
party - in criminal or civil actions - and should be resisted. This caveat
applies with particular force to cases which appear routine.
The California shield law has generally been regarded as "absolute"
and was so categorized in at least two surveys of state statutes.10 How-
ever, as previously noted, 08 the California Court of Appeal imposed
narrow restrictions, based on the doctrine of separation of powers, in
the case of William Farr, and these were later to be reinforced in the
Fresno Four case.
IV. THE FARR CASE
The legal difficulties of William Farr grew out of the 1970 Los
Angeles murder trial of Charles Manson and his codefendants. 09 At
the time the grand jury returned indictments, superior court Judge
William Keene entered an "Order re Publicity" prohibiting attorneys
for the parties, court attaches and witnesses "from releasing for public
dissemination the content or nature of any testimony that might be
given at trial or any evidence whose admissibility might have to be
determined by the court." The order, which did not purport to bind
the press, became effective December 10, 1969, and remained in effect
throughout the trial.' 0
On October 5, 1970, during the course of the trial, Farr, then a re-
porter for the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, learned of a statement
made by Virginia Graham, cellmate of one of the Manson codefendants
(Susan Atkins). This document detailed a statement made to Graham
by Atkins describing Manson "family" plans to torture and murder
106. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975).
107. PRESS CENSORSHIP NEWSLETTER (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press), July-Aug. 1973, at 8; see Zafren, supra note 36, at 44.
108. Infra note 63.
109. The Tate-LaBianca murders, the ghoulish and bizarre behavior of the defend-
ants, and the trial that followed are related in detail by the chief prosecutor. See V.
BUGLIOSI & C. GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER (1974).
110. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
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several prominent show business personalities. Copies of the Graham
statement had been prepared by the prosecution, and were, at the
court's instruction, delivered to each of the defense attorneys."' 1
Farr, in order to corroborate the statement he had received, sought
to obtain a copy of the prosecutor's transcript. He later testified he
obtained copies from two attorneys of record in the case, who had
agreed to violate the restrictive order in exchange for his promise not
to reveal the source. 1 1 2
At an in camera hearing, superior court Judge Charles H. Older
asked Farr if the Herald-Examiner intended to print a story based on
the statement. The judge also requested the identities of the persons
who had given copies of the transcript to Farr. Farr, asserting immunity
from contempt on the basis of Evidence Code section 1070, admitted
that he did have copies, but refused to reveal their source.113
Farr's story appeared in the Herald-Examiner on October 9, 1970,
under an eight-column headline, "Sinatra on Death List - Tate Wit-
ness." The story related details of murders reportedly planned by the
Manson family. 14
Six and a half months later, at the conclusion of the trial, the trial
court conducted hearings to determine who violated the protective
order and to supplement the trial record on appeal. 15 Farr, then no
longer a working journalist but employed as press secretary for the
District Attorney, was ordered by Judge Older to reveal the identity
of persons who had given him copies of the statement; Farr continued
to refuse. At this time he stated that he had obtained three copies of
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 65, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
114. L.A. Herald-Examiner, Oct. 9, 1970, at 1, col. 1. The story, of course, had little
social value and Farr himself recognized this: "I have never claimed there was any
great public good involved in the article I wrote ..... Farr, Bill Farr on His Imprison-
ment, L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1973, § 2 at 7, col. 1. Among the critics of Farr was the
New Republic which labeled the story a "seamy sensational account . . . where the
selling of more newspapers was the only public service rendered." Comment, Who's
Hobbling the Press? NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 1972 at 5, 8. The American Newspaper
Guild came to Farr's defense with an editorial headed Et tu, New Republic? accusing
the magazine of failing to separate the "person from the principle" and of engaging
in an "astonishing defection from the ranks of those fighting the threat to press free-
dom . . . ." Guild Reporter (American Newspaper Guild, AFL-CIO) Feb. 23, 1973,
at 8, col. 1.
The Criminal Courts Bar Association of Los Angeles County, an association con-
sisting of more than 700 defense attorneys, prosecutors and judges, gave Farr "a jour-
nalistic award for his outstanding contribution to the administration of justice in the
criminal field." Katz, A Journalism Award for William Farr's Contribution to Justice,
L.A. Times, Jan. 15, 1973, § 2, at 7, col. 1.
115. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 68, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 34647.
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the Graham statement - one from a person not subject to the court
order and the other from two of the six attorneys of record in the
trial.1 1 6
The trial court recessed the hearing to permit interrogation of the
six attorneys designated by Farr. Each was subpoenaed and testified
that he had not directly or indirectly furnished the Graham statement
to Farr. Members of the prosecutorial team intimated that the state-
ments must have come from one or more of the defense counsel, and
attorneys for the defense intimated the source was the prosecution.117
The hearing resumed with Farr continuing to refuse to answer a
series of questions asking the identity of his sources. On July 28, 1971,
the court cited him in direct contempt, holding that since Farr was
no longer a newsman he was not within the protective scope of the
shield law." On this basis, Farr was ordered incarcerated in the county
jail until he revealed the identity of the attorneys who had supplied
the statement. This sentence was suspended pending appeal. Farr
filed a petition for writ of review with the court of appeal which, in
December 1971, affirmed Judge Older's contempt order."'
In an opinion by Judge Robert S. Thompson (joined by Wood, P. J.,
and Lillie, J.) the appellate court unanimously concluded that the
inquiry conducted by the trial court was necessary to control its own
officers and counsel appearing before it; further, in the "peculiar" and
"narrow" facts of the case, the inquiry was necessary in order to perfect
a record on issues likely to arise on appeal and to protect the integrity
of the trial process. 1 2 0
The court regarded itself as controlled by broad language con-
cerning separation of powers in a 1934 California Supreme Court case
where the San Francisco Chronicle had been held in contempt for pub-
lishing a false, inaccurate report of the prospective disposition of a
celebrated murder case.121 The appellate court ruled that to construe
116. Id. at 65-66, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 66, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
119. Id. at 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
120. Id. at 68-69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47. There is an "undeniable need for dis-
closure," Judge Thompson said, "if the [trial] court is not to be thwarted in its effort
to enforce its order against prejudicial publicity issued to comply with the mandate
of the United States Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell . . . 384 U.S. 333." Id. at
73, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
121. In re San Francisco Chronicle, 1 Cal. 2d 630, 36 P.2d 369 (1934). At that time
Code of Civil Procedure § 1209(13) provided that publication of any article, whatever
its content, not in the physical presence of the court did not constitute contempt. The
state supreme court observed that this portion of the statute "has many times been held
unconstitutional on the ground that the courts have inherent power to punish for con-
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Evidence Code section 1070 as granting immunity to Farr "in the face
of the facts here present would be to countenance an unconstitutional
interference by the legislative branch upon an inherent and vital power
of the court to control its own proceedings and officers."122
While the court failed to reach the narrow issue of whether the
Code protects former members of the news media, the legislature soon
afterwiards amended the statute to provide such coverage.' 2 3
In Farr's appeal, the issues were significantly narrowed: a stipu-
lation had been entered that Farr's source of information included
officers of the court, and no fifth amendment privilege was claimed.
The court commented in a footnote:
We express no opinion on the quantum of proof required to estab-
lish that inquiry into a newsman's source is necessary to permit the
court to carry out its duty to control its own officers and to restrict
persons subject to its control from disseminating prejudicial pre-
trial publicity. Here petitioner has admitted the necessary facts.
Neither do we express an opinion on the validity of Evidence Code
section 1070 where a possible source of the newsman's story con-
trary to a Sheppard order is other than an attorney of record, a
court attache or the prosecutor's office.24
On March 20, 1972, the state supreme court denied Farr's petition
for a hearing,12 and on November 13, 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court
denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. 1 20
With its order thus confirmed, the trial court then conducted two
further hearings at which Farr was given an opportunity to purge
himself of the contempt. He continued to refuse to identify his source.
At the second hearing, each of the six attorneys again denied under
oath that he was the source of the disclosure; all stated that they had
released Farr from any obligation to keep his source secret. Farr, how-
ever, testified that the two culpable, unnamed attorneys had "implored
and beseeched" him to disregard any waiver of confidentiality that they
might make.'12 The trial court ordered execution of its prior contempt
tempts, whether of a direct or constructive nature, and that the legislature cannot con-
stitutionally infringe on that power." Id. at 634, 36 P.2d at 370.
122. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
123. Supra note 49.
124. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 71 n.5, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 349 n.5.
125. Id. at 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
126. 409 U.S. 1011 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127. L.A. Times, Nov. 28, 1972 § 1, at 1, col. 2. When sending Farr to jail Judge
Older said it appeared that the newsman was being a "martyr without cause" or had
made some kind of "under-the-table" deal with the attorneys; Farr called the judge's
remark a "slur." Id. Later, on March 7, 1973, Farr testified before a House subcom-
mittee that his sources privately told him: "Disregard what we said in the court room.
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order on November 16, 1972, and Farr was incarcerated in the county
jail. After he had been confined for forty-six days he was ordered re-
leased on his own recognizance by U.S. Supreme Court Justice William
0. Douglas,128 pending disposition of his petition before the U.S. Court
of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit.
On January 8, 1974, a second writ of habeas corpus filed with the
state court of appeal was denied on all grounds.1 2" Rejecting Farr's
argument that he had been denied due process by an "unexpected
constitutional interpretation," the court stressed that after the opinion
Farr was afforded the opportunity of complying with what had become
the law of the case, but had refused to do so. "It was only after that
refusal, at a time when there could no longer be any question of peti-
tioner's legal obligation, that the trial court ordered execution of the
order. . . ."1o
The controversy was moved toward resolution by the appellate
court's interpretation of a peripheral issue. In holding that the con-
tempt confinement was neither cruel nor unusual punishment, the
court raised the question whether a coercive incarceration to compel
compliance with an order of the court might present "a special problem
where disobedience of the order is based on an established articulated
moral principle.""' Judge Thompson wrote:
In such a situation, it is necessary to determine the point at which
the commitment ceases to serve its coercive purpose and becomes
punitive in character. When that point is reached so that the incar-
ceration becomes penal, its duration is limited by the five-day maxi-
mum sentence provided by the Code of Civil Procedure Section
1218.132
The court held that Farr was entitled to a superior court hearing
to determine whether there was a "substantial likelihood" that con-
It will not take a mental giant to say if four people waive confidentiality and two
don't, it will not take much mental acuity to figure out which of the two of us it is."
1973 House Hearings, supra note 36, at 339. He explained that in his "effort to co-
operate with Judge Older" he conceded that two of the persons who gave him copies
of the Graham statement were among the six attorneys of record still living. (Ronald
Hughes, counsel for one of the defendants, died during the trial.) Farr now considers
this a "catastrophic error" but explains, "my former lawyer felt it had to be conceded
so that I would not be convicted as the 'only avenue of evidence.'" L.A. Times, Jan.
30, 1973, § 2 at 7, col. 1.
128. Farr v. Pitchess, 409 U.S. 1243 (1973), (opinion by Douglas, J., in camera,
citing the unfairness of imprisoning Farr while substantial questions concerning the
California shield law were under consideration).
129. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
130. Id. at 582, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
131. Id. at 584, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
132. Id.
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tinued incarceration would accomplish the purpose of the order upon
which the commitment was based - i.e., the revealing of the persons
who had violated the order.' 3
The special superior court hearing held in May, 1974, was assigned
to Judge William Levit. Three nationally-known newsmen' 34 testified
to the importance of being able to promise confidentiality to sources
in order to obtain information about criminal acts or corruption in
government. Farr himself testified that there was "zero likelihood" that
anything could make him name the two attorneys. "There is nothing,"
he said, "including prolonged jailing that is going to alter that." 53
On June 20, 1974, noting that Farr's symbolic stand for the news-
man's privilege of confidentiality placed "significant additional weight
behind Farr's resolve to uphold what he sincerely believes to be the
ethical requirement of his profession. . . ," Judge Levit found that there
was an "established articulated moral principle" believed by newsmen
to be essential to the effective gathering of news and that Farr had
established himself as a responsible newsman, firmly committed to
this principle. Therefore, he concluded there was "no substantial likeli-
hood that further incarceration of Farr [would] result in his compliance
with the court's order to reveal the identity of his sources or otherwise
serve the purposes of said order."' 3  Such sentence, he said, would
not be coercive but rather punitive in nature, and it thus was limited
in duration by the maximum provisions of Civil Procedure Code sec-
tion 1218. On July 29, 1974, Farr was given the maximum punitive
sentence of five days and a fine of five hundred dollars by Judge Older,
who said Farr "held himself above the law" and that circumstances of
the case "warranted a much more severe sentence, were it within the
power of this court to impose."m
The court first had to dispose of the question whether Farr could
be sentenced to sixty-five days - five for each of the thirteen questions
133. Id. Superior Court Pnesiding Judge Alfred J. McCourtney described the pro-
cedure as so unusual that he was unclear how and by whom the hearing should be
conducted. L.A. Times, Feb. 27, 1974, § 2 at 8, col. 1. Judge Older refused to dis-
qualify himself on grounds of bias, but agreed to step aside. He commented that in
light of the appellate court ruling "it would not be inappropriate for the limited issue
raised to be heard by another judge of this court." L.A. Times, May 20, 1974, § 2 at
14, col. 1.
134. CBS Anchorman Walter Cronkite, NBC White House Correspondent Tom Bro-
kaw, and the L.A. Times' top investigative reporter, Jack Nelson.
135. L.A. Times, May 21, 1974, § 2, at 1, col. 3.
136. In re Farr (petition for habeas corpus) No. A 253 156 (Superior Court of Los
Angeles County June 20, 1974), at 19. The 20-page opinion is reprinted in the Cali-
fornia Publisher (California Newspaper Publishers Association) in a special, unpaginated
section (July 1974).
137. L.A. Times, July 30, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
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he had refused to answer. It was promptly agreed that the questions
represented one contempt of court, not thirteen.'as
Farr, the judge said, published a "lurid, sensational" story and
acted with "reckless disregard" of the rights of the Manson defendants
to a fair trial. Farr commented to newsmen that the court had "con-
veniently ignored" the fact that the Manson jury had been sequestered
at a cost of $230,000 and could not have read the story. Only the com-
ments of the defendants quoted in the article, Farr maintained, were
"lurid and sensational" - not the article itself.'o
An order of commitment was issued by Judge Older on August 6,
but Farr remained free until the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth
Circuit ruled on a writ of habeas corpus pending before that court.o4 0
A year later, in August 1975, the Ninth Circuit upheld Farr's convic-
tion, declaring that "where the case is a notorious one" the burden on
the court for insuring a fair trial is "heavy." The three-judge panel
recognized that Branzburg conferred "at least a partial shield" but that
it must yield to a "higher value, i.e., to the due process guarantee of
a fair trial to [the] defendant in a criminal case." The first amendment
protection of Branzburg, the court said, "collided head on with a com-
pelling judicial interest in disclosure of those persons frustrating a
duly entered order of the court."' Farr's incarceration was held "not
in violation of any federally guaranteed right." 4 Farr again appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court on September 22, 1975, but the Court
denied certiorari.14 3
Judge Older then scheduled a formal sentencing, but a new petition
was filed with the state court of appeal which granted a stay of Farr's
five-day jail sentence.144 The appellate court called for a hearing on
November 23 and requested Judge Older to show cause why the
contempt proceedings should not be dropped.1 5
The court of appeal ruled on December 6, 1976, that in light of a
1971 criminal contempt acquittal of Farr, he cbuld not be jailed again,
barring the imposition of a punitive five-day sentence.'4 In December
138. In re Farr (petition for habeas corpus) No. A 253 156 (Superior Court of Los
Angeles County June 20, 1974) at 16.
139. Id.
140. 522 F.2d 464 (1975).
141. Id. at 468.
142. Id. at 469.
143. Farr v. Pitchess, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
144. Farr v. Superior Court, No. 49141 (2d D. Ct. App. July 23, 1976).
145. In re Farr, 64 Cal. App. 3d 605, 134 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1976).
146. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 611, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
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1971, Farr had faced criminal contempt charges initiated by Judge
Older, and in a hearing before superior court Judge Bernard Jefferson
he was found not guilty of any contempt. 1 47
The appellate court based its ruling on section 654 of the California
Penal Code14 8 which reads in part:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways
by different provisions of this code may be punished under either
of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more
than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one
bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.
The issue before it, the court said, was not whether Judge Older
could procedurally separate the coercive and punitive proceedings, but
rather whether the criminal proceedings instituted after the December
1971 acquittal were barred by the Penal Code clause precluding mul-
tiple prosecutions.14" The court concluded that the two criminal con-
tempt proceedings arose "out of the same course of conduct" and that
Farr's earlier acquittal barred the subsequent action."o
The contumacy that created Farr's problems occurred in July 1971.
The case was finally resolved some five and a half years later-after five
appeals and eight writs of habeas corpus involving fifty-six judges (not
counting ancillary or peripheral cases) and producing more than 50,000
pages of transcript, opinions, hearings and depositions.''
Farr has continued to have legal troubles stemming from his
staunch protection of confidential sources. In one action, he was or-
dered to testify in Los Angeles County Grand Jury proceedings in-
vestigating perjury complaints against two attorneys in the Manson
case - Dave Shinn and Vincent T. Bugliosi - charged with lying under
oath in denying that they gave Farr a transcript of Virginia Graham's
147. Id. The court ruled that there was no evidence that Farr had solicited a lawyer
to violate the restrictive order except for Farr's own testimony, and that his testimony
was protected by the Evidence Code. L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 1971, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
148. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1970).
149. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 612-13, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 598-99.
150. Id. at 614-15, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 600. The court noted that had Judge Older
wanted to insure that Farr would serve a punitive sentence as well as coercive incarcer-
ation, the criminal contempt proceeding could have been held on July 28, 1971 "or at
the same time as or combined with the hearing on the civil contempt or instituted by
order to show cause thereafter, but prior to December 6, 1971, and punitive sentence
pursuant to section 1218, Code of Civil Procedure could have been imposed and the
execution thereof suspended until termination of the coercive commitment." Id. at 615,
134 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
151. Telephone interview with Mark Hurwitz, Farr's attorney (Feb. 11, 1977).
126 COMM/Ewr [Vol. 1
statement.' 5 2 Superior court Judge Raymond Choate later reversed
himself to rule that Farr was protected by the shield law and vacated
a contempt citation.153
Later, Farr was called as a witness to testify at the perjury trial
itself but refused to repeat the "two-of-six" statement, which he char-
acterized as a "serious error." His attorney commented that because a
mistake was made once does not mean it must be repeated.' 5 4 Again
Farr was found to be protected by Evidence Code section 1070,'" and
the perjury charges ultimately were dropped against Bugliosi'5 and
Shinn.' 5 7
In a civil action, two of the defense attorneys in the Manson case,
Paul Fitzgerald and Irving Kanarek, filed a $24 million libel suit claim-
ing they were "under a cloud of suspicion" and hence defamed by Farr's
refusal to specify the two individuals who had violated the court order.
Named as defendants were Farr, the Los Angeles Times, CBS, KNX
Radio, the other trial attorneys, Shinn and Bugliosi, and Attorney
General Younger.' 58
Farr asked the court of appeal to overrule a superior court judge's
order that he answer questions as to whether he received a copy of
the Graham transcript from Fitzgerald or Kanarek and whether either
privately released him from a promise of confidentiality while main-
taining he would testify to the contrary.'5 9
Superior court Judge Robert Weil held that the shield law does
not apply to the civil libel case, since it protects newsmen from refusing
152. Id.
153. See People v. Bugliosi, No. A 308 882 (Superior Court of Los Angeles County
Oct. 3, 1974), People v. Shinn, No. A 308 882 (Superior Court of Los Angeles County
Dec. 4, 1974).
154. L.A. Times, July 3, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
155. People v. Bugliosi, People v. Shinn, No. A 308 882 (Superior Court of Los
Angeles County Oct. 2, 1974).
156. People v. Bugliosi, No. A 308 882 (Superior Court of Los Angeles County Oct.
3, 1974). A special prosecutor described Farr's refusal to testify about his sources as
a "fatal blow." L.A. Times, Oct. 2, 1974, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
157. People v. Shinn, No. A 308 882 (Superior Court of Los Angeles County Dec.
4, 1974).
158. Younger was later dismissed as a defendant. Kanarek v. Farr, No. C 71034
(Superior Court of Los Angeles County Nov. 1, 1973). The charges were dismissed
on the ground that he was immune from charges of conspiracy to refuse to clear Fitz-
gerald and Kanarek. The remaining two attorneys in the trial, Deputy District Attorneys
Stephen Kay and Donald Musich, were joined as defendants in the libel suit only to
protect their legal interests. L.A. Times, July 30, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
159. See Kanarek v. Farr, No. C 71034 (Superior Court of Los Angeles County Jan.
31, 1977).
No. 11 127SHIELD LAWS AND SUBPOENAS
to disclose sources only when they are third parties, and not when they
are defendants in litigation. The appellate court refused to reverse
the lower court order.o Continued refusal by Farr to testify may
result in further contempt charges and in a default judgment in the
libel suit."c'
V. THE FRESNO FOUR
The starting blocks for the Fresno Four ' 2 were a series of bribery-
conspiracy indictments handed down in late October, 1974, by the
Fresno County Grand Jury against three men: city councilman Marc
A. Stefano, land developer Julius Aluisi, and former city planning com-
missioner Norman Bains. The indictments charged Stefano with ac-
cepting a $4,000 kickback from Aluisi for helping him obtain a $11,250
refund in sewer fees from the City of Fresno in June 1973. Aluisi and
Bains were accused of offering a $1,000 bribe to obtain a legal opinion
from the City Attorney's Office in support of the refund. All three
pleaded not guilty.
On November 21, 1974, one day before the grand jury transcript
would have become a public document, Judge Denver C. Peckinpah,
at the request of the defendants and pursuant to the California Penal
Code, sealed the transcript until the conclusion of the trial.163 The
following day Judge Peckinpah, at the request or concurrence of the
defendants, issued a protective order restricting public communica-
tions by attorneys, parties, public officials and persons subpoenaed in
the case.1 64
On January 12, 13, and 14, 1975, news stories quoting extensively
from the sealed grand jury transcript appeared on the front page of
The Fresno Bee."' In response, Judge Peckinpah ordered proceedings
160. Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, Kanarek and Fitzgerald, real parties in
interest, No. 50966 (2d D. Ct. App. July 28, 1977).
161. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
162. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976). The Fresno Bee is owned
by McClatchy Newspapers, publishers also of the Sacramento Bee and Modesto Bee.
163. CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1(b) (West Supp. 1977) provides that a grand jury
transcript shall not be open to the public until 10 days after its delivery to the defendant
or his attorney and that thereafter any part of the transcript may be sealed until after
the trial by court order on the motion of either party or on the court's own motion
where there is a "reasonable likelihood" that disclosure would prejudice the defendant's
right to a fair trial. This was a 1971 legislative amendment codifying Craemer v. Su-
perior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968).
164. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
165. All three front page stories carried the by-lines of reporters Joe Rosato and
William K. Patterson.
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to punish disobedience of the court's order and perfect the record
pertaining to pretrial publicity (likely to be an issue on appeal).
The Bee's interest in the transcript centered on testimony by Ste-
fano that was unrelated to ihe case in which he was initially charged.
Stefano, a lawyer, had testified he had received a $5,000 'retainer' from
a group seeking to win a franchise for the city's garbage collection.
The councilman admitted he was promised an additional $20,000 if
he could win passage of the proposal by the city council.oo
The newspaper's managing editor, George F. Gruner, has ex-
plained:
For about two months we wrestled with the legal and ethical
problems involved and were still considering the pros and cons of
publication when a.decision became imperative. There were indica-
tions the garbage franchise proposal was about to be presented to
the council. Thus the question in our minds became the public's
right to know versus an elected official's rights as an individual. We
felt the electorate was entitled to the information that an apparent
conflict of interest involving that particular councilman existed
before the council voted on the garbage franchise proposal.
Since the venue of the trials had been changed it seemed a
simple decision. We printed the stories and the garbage franchise
seekers beat a hasty retreat. We considered - and still feel - the
stories served the public interest.'
Gruner and the two reporters, Joe Rosato and William K. Patterson,
were served with a subpoena duces tecum directing them to produce
any copy of the transcript that might be in their possession or under
their control. They filed a motion to quash, alleging that the news
articles were derived from a confidential source. The motion was
denied.6 8
Judge Peckinpah then ordered proceedings for the purpose of
punishing disobedience of the court's order and perfecting the record
pertaining to pretrial publicity. On January 24, all thirteen attorneys,
officers and employees who had access to the transcript denied making
the material available to the newsmen.' At that hearing each news-
man testified he did not obtain the "source material" from a person
subject to the sealing order. 70
166. Interview with George F. Gruner, Managing Editor, Fresno Bee (March 12,
1977).
167. Id.
168. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 202, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
169. Id. at 202, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
170. Id. at 203, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
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In subsequent hearings, Jim Bort, the city editor, testified that al-
though the articles had been written a month earlier, they were pub-
lished only after changes of venue had been granted for the Stefano and
Aluisi trials."' The decision to publish, the newspaper maintained, was
made partially in consideration of the fact that Stefano was a sitting
member of the city council and that the articles contained nothing with
respect to Bains that was significantly different from material already
published.'" 2
At the January 24 hearing the newsmen responded to all questions
they thought would not lead to revealing the source of the information.
Rosato refused to answer when questioned as to whether he had ob-
tained a copy of the transcript from a court official or attorney without
his consent.'7 3 After further hearings, on January 27 Rosato was held
in contempt twenty-seven times for refusing to answer questions, Pat-
terson twenty-five times and Gruner nine times. Bort, who was not to
testify until April 21, was later cited seventeen times.' 74
Sentencing was scheduled for February 6, but the case was re-
opened when it was learned that Patterson had a master key to the
courthouse. The key, which he had obtained two or three years earlier,
gave him access to the judges' chambers and the public defender's
office; but the newsmen testified that the key was not used in acquiring
the source of the published articles."17
At the hearing Judge Peckinpah warned the three newsmen that
any further refusal to answer questions should be based on the fifth
171. Id. at 204, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 436. Defendant Stefano's motion for change of
venue to Alameda County (where he was acquitted) was granted on January 3, 1975.
L.A. Times, April 22, 1975, § 3, at 8, col. 4. At the time of the indictment, Bains was
already serving a prison sentence on a heroin peddling conviction and his trial was
never transferred from Fresno County. He was returned from prison to testify before
the grand jury. Id. Aluisi's trial was transferred on January 7 to Monterey County where
he was convicted on bribery-conspiracy charges and sentenced to serve six months in
jail, given three years' probation and fined $3,000. Monterey Peninsula Herald, July 28,
1975, at 17, col. 8. An appeal was denied by the state supreme court. Sacramento Bee,
Dec. 30, 1976, at 7, col. 1.
172. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 204-05, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
173. Id. at 203-04, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
174. id. at 205, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 436. The District Attorney said the newsmen faced
either or both a five-day jail term or $500 fine on each count - a total of 305 days in
jail and a $301,500 fine. L.A. Times, Jan. 28, 1975, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
175. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 204, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 436. Many newspapers were reportedly
uneasy about possession of the key even though the newsmen testified the key played
no part in the access and that other court reporters carried keys to other parts of the
building. The Washington Post's ombudsman, Charles B. Seib, commented that he found
it "disturbing that one of the newsmen had a courthouse master key" but that "what
is really at stake" is the "confidentiality of news sources." Another Protest Against Jailing
of Fresno Bee Newsman, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Sept. 18, 1976, at 7.
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amendment protection against self-incrimination rather than the "now
obviously inapplicable provisions" of the California newsmen's shield
law.170
The four newsmen petitioned the Fifth District Court of Appeal
to halt the contempt proceedings, maintaining that only a grand jury,
not a superior court judge, had the power to make such an investiga-
tion."17 The court ruled that the judge did have the "obligation and
duty" to conduct the investigation."1 7  Later, after the state supreme
court refused to block the inquiry,' 7 9 U.S. Supreme Court Justice
William 0. Douglas granted an order delaying the investigation, 80
but on March 31 the full court vacated the stay. 8 1
In April, Judge Peckinpah sentenced Gruner, Patterson, Bort,
and Rosato to indefinite terms in the county jail.18 2 The sentences were
stayed pending appeal. 8 3 The case attracted nationwide interest, and
eight amicus curiae briefs were filed.' 84 Oral arguments were held on
July 11, just two and a half hours before the newsmen were scheduled
to be jailed.185
On September 8, 1975, the court of appeal, in an opinion written by
presiding Judge George Brown and joined by Judge Roy G. Gargano,
held that the sixth amentment right to a fair trial outweighed any
statutory rights of the petitioners. However, it annulled eighteen of
the seventy-three contempt citations that had been issued and gave
the newsmen another chance to purge their contempt "in view of the
understandable uncertainty as to the scope of the privilege, and believ-
ing the petitioners refused to answer the . . . questions in good faith."se
Judge Franson filed a separate opinion dissenting on the extent of the
newsmen's privilege.187
The appellate court emphasized that the trial court had the au-
176. Oakland Tribune, Feb. 8, 1975 § 1, at 16, col. 1.
177. Oakland Tribune, March 6, 1975, § 1, at 2, col. 5.
178. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 223, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
179. L.A. Times, March 20, 1975, § 1, at 2, col. 6.
180. L.A. Times, March 22, 1975, § 2, at 1, col. 1. Patterson v. Superior Court, 420
U.S. 1301 (1975).
181. 420 U.S. 1301 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
182. Molen, The Fresno Four and a Judge Named Peckinpah, THE QUILL, July-
August 1975, at 33.
183. L.A. Times, May 21, 1975, § 1, at 21, col. 6.
184. Sacramento Bee, May 23, 1975, § A, at 21, col. 6.
185. L.A. Times, July 12, 1975, § 1, at 24, col. 5. See detailed coverage by N.Y.
Times, May 14, 1975, § 1, at 26, col. 1.
186. 51 Cal, App. 3d at 231, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
187. Id. at 231-41, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 459-66.
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thority ("beyond cavil") to issue its protective and seal orders.',, The
court held that the trial judge need only be satisfied that there was a
"reasonable likelihood" of prejudicial news which would make it diffi-
cult to impanel an impartial jury and tend to prevent a fair trial. 89
The "pivotal issue," the court observed, was the interpretation of the
scope and limitations of the state's newsmen's shield law.'90 Because
the orders were valid, the judge had the "authority and duty" to
investigate possible violations. 91
As in Farr, the court held that the shield law's protection is subject
to a constitutional limitation based on the judiciary's inherent contempt
power.19 2
The court refused to distinguish Farr, though several aspects of
the case permit differentiation. First, the Farr opinion itself referred
to the "peculiar"'"' and "narrow"'9 4 facts before it. Second, in the
Fresno case, the newsmen did not "trigger" the court's obligation by
admitting that a court officer violated the restrictive order, but instead
asserted that they did not get the information from a person subject
to the ruling.'", The court held that "the factual difference [from
Farr] was one of degree, not principle."'9" It refused to accept the
"crabbed view" of the judicial obligation implied by the "triggering"
language in Farr.
In the Fresno case, the court reasoned, there was a precise record
of persons to whom copies of the transcript had been delivered; each
of them was subject to the protective order. Although the newsmen
denied receiving a copy from the only persons to whom copies were
made available "it is undisputed that the statements which appeared
in The Fresno Bee were directly quoted from the transcript." The court
refused to accept the view that it was impotent to proceed further once
denials had been entered by court officials and the press. 9 7
In the face of such an "unresolved mystery," the Fresno court said
that the trial judge was "not required to believe witnesses."9 8 Its in-
188. Id. at 208, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 216, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
191. Id. at 210, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
192. Id. at 222, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
193. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 68, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
194. Id. at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
195. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 223, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (1976).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 223-24, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
198. Id. at 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
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vestigation could not be cut short by mere denials that the order had
been violated.
Judge Brown observed, however, that the limitations on an "other-
wise absolute" shield law were applicable "only when the questions
asked might tend to identify who, if anyone, among those subject to
a court's order, may have violated it."o 9 The court stressed that Cali-
fornia's shield law - as in Farr - "remains as a protection against the
revelation of all sources other than those court officers subject to the
orders issued by the court."200
The court stated that the test must be applied through a question-
by-question determination of whether an answer might tend to reveal
a protected source. Conceding that its test was "somewhat abstruce ,"201
the court attached as an appendix a list of the seventy-three questions
the four newsmen had refused to answer. The court indicated whether
each question should have been answered and in some instances
provided explanatory comments. 2 0 2
The petitioners also claimed a first amendment qualified privilege
based on Branzburg v. Hayes. 20 3 In Branzburg, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered on first impression the constitutional right of newsmen to
keep sources confidential. The court, per Justice White, held, 5-4, that
the "consequential but uncertain burden on newsgathering" created by
compelling newsmen to testify was outweighed by the historic role
played by the grand jury and the public interest in "fair and effective
law enforcement." 2 0 4
Justice White's opinion commanded a majority only with the con-
currence of Justice Powell, who emphasized the "limited nature"2 05 of
the Branzburg holding and seemed to support some sort of qualified
privilege. (In a later opinion, he clarified his acceptance of a balancing
test to be applied on a case-by-case basis. )206
In dissent, three justices (Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall) recog-
nized a qualified privilege, holding the government must show (1)
that the information was clearly relevant to a specfic, probable viola-
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 225, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
202. Id. at 242-47, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 454-59.
203. 408 U.S. 665.
204. Id. at 690-91.
205. Id. at 710. "The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a
case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such ques-
tions." Id.
206. Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 850-75 (1974) (Powell, J., Brennan,
J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tion of the law; (2) that the information sought could not be obtained
by alternate means, and (3) a compelling state need. 207 Justice
Douglas stated that only an absolute privilege for newsmen would
satisfy the first amendment .208
Relying on the confusing nature of the Branzburg opinion, news-
paper attorneys, describing Justice White's opinion as a "plurality"200
have sought to articulate a qualified constitutional privilege. Though
it has not been uniformly accepted by the courts, a growing number
of cases in a wide variety of situations has held that newsmen would
not be required to reveal confidential sources. 21 0
For the appellate court in the Fresno situation, however, such a
qualified first amendment right was of "uncertain dimensions."211 It
found "readily distinguishable and reconcilable" those cases in which
a constitutional privilege has been upheld.21 2 In any case, Judge Brown
concluded that the requirements of relevancy and compelling need
had been satisfied and that the court in Branzburg imposed no require-
ment that alternate sources be exhausted.2 13
Justice Franson agreed with the majority's findings that the trial
court had the authority to conduct its investigation and that the shield
law should be given a broad interpretation.2 14 However, he asserted a
much more vigorous first amendment right and proposed a five-pronged
balancing test in which the factors are: (1) the potential chilling effect
on future news stories; (2) the public interest served by disclosure of
the confidential source; (3) the existence of alternate sources; (4) the
relevance of the inquiry, and (5) the impact of the inquiry on the
rights of others. 2' 5
On August 4, 1976, the state supreme court, pending determina-
tion of a petition for hearing, stayed execution of the commitment or-
ders two and a half hours before the newsmen were scheduled to
be jailed.2 16 On September 2, however, the court denied a hearing and
207. 408 U.S. at 725-52.
208. Id. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
209. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for News-
men, 26 HASTINcs L.J. 709, 715 (1975).
210. See Goodale, Subpoenas, COMMUNICATIONs LAW 9-33 (1976).
211. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 213; 124 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
212. Id. at 215 n.14, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 444 n.14.
213. Id. at 216, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
214. Id. at 231, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 459-60.
215. Id. at 238-39, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 464-65.
216. Sacramento Bee, Aug. 5, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 2.
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vacated the stay,217 and the following day the four newsmen began
serving indefinite sentences on order of Superior Court Judge Hollis
G. Best.'"
On entering jail (after a twenty-month fight to avoid it) Gruner
was quoted as saying: "Under no circumstances will we reveal our
sources." The four argued that the open-ended sentences were an
"exercise in futility" since they could not be coerced. 219
However, the county counsel suggested that jail might weaken the
newsmen's resolve: "[T]hey have not spent one day in custody. For all
that is presently known, the petitioners might well change their minds
after a relatively short period of coercive incarceration."220
On September 9, a motion was filed in superior court asking for a
hearing to determine whether it would be productive to continue to
coerce the four newsmen, and Judge Best set a hearing for September
17.221
The proceedings resembled those in the Farr case. Jack Nelson,
Washington bureau chief of the Los Angeles Times, reiterated that
confidentiality of sources is a necessity of journalistic life. Syndicated
columnist Jack Anderson testified he had never heard of a news re-
porter divulging a confidential source.2 2- Also testifying was a Fresno
psychiatrist, Dr. Paul Levy, who said he had interviewed the four men
217. Gruner v. Superior Court, 5th Civil No. 3101 (Cal. Supreme Ct., Sept. 2, 1976),
Cal. Official Advance Sheets (Bancroft-Whitney), Sept. 23, 1976, No. 26, Minutes, p.4.
One of the newsmen's attorneys rushed off to Washington to seek a stay from Associate
Justices Rehnquist or Brennan, but he encountered the "final frustration." Sacramento
Bee, Sept. 4, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 4. Before the four had finished the booking process
and had been transported to the 500-acre Fresno County Industrial Farm, two justices
had rejected the appeal (explaining that four votes were not available). Id.
218. Judge Peckinpah had suffered a heart attack on July 17, 1975 and been granted
a disability retirement. Molen, Fresno Four in Throes of Judicial Balancing Act, THE
QUILL, Oct. 1975, at 7.
219. L.A. Times, Aug. 5, 1976, § 2, at 2, col. 6.
220. Sacramento Bee, Sept. 3, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 1. At the prison farm the four
were housed in an "honor" section in a 12' by 12' room with four bunks and a tele-
vision set. The four were segregated from the criminal prisoners and permitted to dress
in street clothes; all other inmates were garbed in pale green T-shirts and blue jeans.
Sacramento Bee, Sept. 4, 1976, § A, at 7, col. 3. They spent their time watching TV,
reading, playing cards and chess, exercising on gym equipment, and enjoying the pas-
toral aura of the farm. Gruner described the setting as "quite bucolic." L.A. Times,
Sept. 5, 1976, § 2, at 2, col. 5. Like Farr, who was kept on the L.A. Times payroll
during his 46 days in the county jail, the Fresno Four did not suffer financially. Their
bi-weekly pay checks were deposited in their accounts, and McClatchy Newspapers paid
all legal costs - estimated at $100,000. Sacramento Bee, Sept. 16, 1976, § A, at 24,
col. 1.
221. Sacramento Bee, Sept. 16, 1976, § A, at 11, col. 1.
222. Sacramento Bee, Sept. 18, 1976, § A, at 15, col. 1.
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a total of eight hours and had probed specifically for any weaknesses
that might indicate they would crack under incarceration.2 2 .
After a day-long session, followed by a recess of an hour and a half,
Judge Best returned to the bench as 5:30 p.m. to announce a decision:
The court is persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that
there is an established articulated moral principle in the existing,
in the news media or at least the persons that make up the news
media, such as these gentlemen. I am further persuaded that that
moral principle is the newsmen's ethic as testified to in this court;
that being not to disclose a source to whom an express promise of
confidentiality was made. I am not going to attempt to elaborate
upon the rightness or wrongness of that ethic as an abstract matter
because I don't think it is relevant to the issues before this court in
this proceeding. 224
Judge Best concluded that "there is no substantial likelihood that
continued incarceration will accomplish the purpose of the court's
order; that is, force or compel, if you wish, these gentlemen to answer
the questions."22 5
Holding that the four newsmen were "still legally and factually in
contempt of court," Judge Best imposed on each a punitive sentence
of five days in custody. The four were given credit for time already
served and released. 2" They had spent fifteen days in jail.
The next day they returned to work,2 2 7 but also made an appear-
ance at the convention of the State Bar of California, being held in
Fresno. There the Conference of Delegates approved a resolution com-
223. Id. at col. 3.
224. Reporter's Partial Transcript, People v. Robertson, Nos. 28498, 28498-A, 28498-
B (Superior Court of Fresno County Sept. 17, 1976) at 2-3.
225. Id. at 3-4.
226. Judge Best accepted the precedent of In re Keller, 49 Cal. App. 3d 663, 123
Cal. Rptr. 223 (1975), cited by the newsmen's counsel, in which a witness refused to
answer six questions asked in the course of a single inquiry; multiple findings and pun-
ishment for the contempt were held in excess of the authority of the trial court.
227. Bort had become the Fresno Bee's ombudsman in February, 1976. See his
"op-ed" column in the N.Y. Times expressing opposition to a federal shield law. Bort,
The Press and the Law, N.Y. Times, November 8, 1976, § 1, at 31, col. 2. The Sacra-
mento Bee's ombudsman concluded that the McClatchy Newspapers did not report the
court's side of the controversy "faithfully in the detail necessary for the reader's fullest
understanding." The file of news stories, he said, was heavily pro-press and pro-Bee
and read "almost as if the Bee expected the reader to know the other side." C. K. Mc-
Clatchy, editor of the Sacramento Bee, disagreed with this criticism, taking the position
that the newspaper's reporters and editors went out of their way to present the court's
point of view. "[T]here has been no suggestion from any representative of the court
that the coverage was anything other than objective and fair," he commented. Severson,
Bee's Fresno 4 Coverage Emerged Overly pro-Bee, Sacramento Bee, Sept. 29, 1976, §
B, at 1, col. 1.
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mending "the courage of the Fresno four in declining to reveal the
source of their information on pain of imprisonment." 2 2 8
The journal of the California Judges Association responded with
an editorial comment: "Being lambasted in the press on gag orders is
now the usual, a little strange is the somewhat oblique attack by the
established Bar (as an example - its Resolution praising the Fresno
Four). This is so because gag orders arise from motions made by
attorneys." 2 29
Outside the convention building, the American Civil Liberties
Union held a rally at which the four men spoke. Commented Gruner:
"It was the law that put us in jail and it was the law that got us out.
We would hope that we can work on the law that put us in so it will
not be necessary to use the law that got us out."2so
The task of working on the law got under way early in the 1977
Legislative session in Sacramento with the introduction of an Assembly
Constitutional amendment (ACA 4), carrying the names of 15 co-spon-
sors and six co-authors in the Senate. The amendment would enact the
provisions of Evidence Code 1070 into the state constitution, thus
counteracting the effect of the Farr and Rosato decisions. The measure
cleared the Assembly on June 24 by a vote of 54 to 22, the exact margin
required, and was sent to the Senate, where a two-thirds vote is also
required.2 31
228. The vote was 229 to 190. Transcript, Proceedings of the 42nd annual meeting
of the Conference of Delegates, State Bar of California, Sept. 18, 1976 at 282. The reso-
lution as originally introduced also praised William Farr and Daniel Schorr but their
names were stricken by the passage of amendments. Id. at 281-300.
229. CAL. CTS. COMMENTARY, Jan. 1977, at 2.
230. Sacramento Bee, Sept. 20, 1976, § A, at 14, col. 5.
231. Assembly Constitutional Amendment (Jerry Lewis, R-Highland), referred to
the Committee on Judiciary, Dec. 6, 1976. The California Newspaper Publishers Asso-
ciation, at its November Board of Directors meeting, adopted a "no position" policy
on the proposal. The board agreed with its Governmental Affairs Committee that no
newspaper consensus existed at that time and preferred a "wait-and-see approach."
Interview with Harry F. Casey, President, CNPA, in San Francisco (Feb. 7, 1977).
If the constitutional amendment were defeated at the polls there has been speculation
that the judiciary might interpret this as public support for sending newsmen off to jail.
Sacramento Bee, Oct. 10, 1976, Forum sec., at 1, col. 10. And if the amendment were
approved a question could be raised concerning whether it was compatible with the
Constitution. It has also been asked whether an amendment to the Constitution that
gives priority to freedom of the press (CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 2) runs the risk of con-
flict with other coequal sections of the Constitution, viz., right of the accused (CALIF.
CONsT. art. I, § 15) and grand juries (CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 23). "Fact Sheet on
Shield Laws," Memorandum by Sen. John F. Dunlap, Chairman, Senate Democratic
Caucus, California legislature, Oct. 27, 1976, at 18. On April 14, the proposed amend-
ment was approved by the Assembly Judiciary Committee, 6 to 4. L.A. Daily Journal,
April 15, 1977, at 1, col. 6. To be placed on the ballot an amendment must achieve a
two-thirds affirmative vote in both houses.
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VI. RESTRICTIVE ORDERS: BACKGROUND AND
PRESENT STATUS
Both the Farr and Rosato cases arose as a result of newsmen being
subpoenaed to testify concerning violations of judicial protective or-
ders. Legal authority for such restrictions stems from the inherent
contempt power of the courts and from language in Sheppard v.
Maxwell,3 2 in which the U.S. Supreme Court admonished a trial court
for not preventing unfairness and for failing to take steps to prevent
the "carnival atmosphere" of the trial.2 The Sheppard guidelines and
developments such as the impact of television 2 3 and the Supreme
Court's increased concern with the rights of defendants"' coalesced
to heighten the awareness of free press/fair trial issues.
Lower court judges felt compelled to implement the Sheppard
"mandate," issuing an increasing number of restrictive orders.2'" They
also were reacting to the report of the American Bar Association's
Advisory Committe on Fair Trial and Free Press - a series of recom-
mendations aimed at cutting down the flow of potentially prejudicial
information (known as the "Reardon Report" after the committee's
chairman, Justice Paul C. Reardon of Massachusetts). 2
The media were harsh in denouncing the Reardon proposals as
"drastic" and an "overkill." Objections centered on the lack of flexibility
put on dissemination of certain kinds of information.23* In response,
232. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
233. Id. at 358.
234. Sheppard comments on the "pervasiveness of modern communications." Id. at
362.
235. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
236. Judge Arthur L. Alarcon, who issued the restrictive order in the Sirhan case,
once commented in a panel discussion before a news organization: "I'm a trial judge,
I just work within the system. I took an oath to uphold the laws of this state and the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. If you don't like that language
your quarrel is not with Arthur Alarcon. Your quarrel is with the United States Sut-
preme Court." THE ASSOCIATED PRESS 'MANACING EDITORs AsSoCIATIoN REDBOOK, 1974,
at 61 [hereinafter cited as 1974 APME REDBOOKi.
237. American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, 1968 (final draft) (the "Reardon Re-
port"). For details on the development of the committee and its report see Reardon,
The Fair Trial - Free Press Controversy - Where We Have Been and Where We Are
Going, 4 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1967); Shapiro, Background and Development of the
Recommendations of American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and
Free Press, 22 OKLA. L. REV. 127 (1969); Gillmor, The Reardon Report: A Journalists
Assessment, 1967 Wisc. L. REV. 215 (1967).
238. "(T]hc reaction of the press was a shrill scream of protest, the common denom-
inator of which was that the Reardon report was an invitation to the secret administra-
tion of justice." THE EcONOMIsT, Oct. 29, 1966, at 473. See, e.g., Ragan, Tile ABA
Recommendations: A Newspaperman's Critique, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 888 (1967).
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Judge Reardon decried the "massive" and "gross overreaction" by the
news media, 23" and the Advisory Committee brought out an informa-
tion manual stressing that its rules were not intended to restrict in-
vestigation by newsmen, who were free to print any information
developed through individual enterprise. 2 40
After discussions with the media, the ABA acceded to suggested
modifications but rejected requests that action on the Reardon pro-
posals be delayed. The recommendations were approved by the ABA
House of Delegates in February, 1968.241
A short time later the Advisory Committee turned its efforts toward
the development of voluntary agreements in the various states, and
currently a total of twenty-three states have some form of code or
agreement. 2 4 2
In California, the State Bar agreed to withhold action on the Rear-
don report pending exploration of alternative ways of seeking an ac-
commodation. Leaders of the State Bar indicated reluctance to restrict
relations between an attorney and the media and expressed hope that
a more suitable method could be achieved. 24 3 A Committee to Confer
See generally, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1968, at 16, col. 1 (statement by the American
Society of Newspaper Editors), N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1968, at 26, col. 2. (extracts from
several newspaper editorials opposing the passage of the Reardon Report). The contro-
versy reached new intensity in 1972 following a Louisiana federal case holding two
news reporters in contempt for violating an order not to print testimony taken in a
public hearing. The order was held invalid, but since the newsmen had published their
stories and not challenged the order on appeal the district court on remand reinstated
the contempt convictions. The case represented an application of the "collateral attack"
doctrine promulgated in such cases as United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947)
and Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). But see Prettyman, Press
Freedom: Legal Threats, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1975, at 9, col. 2; Goodale, The Press
'Gag' Order Epidemic, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Sept.-Oct. 1973), at 49.
239. Reardon, The Fair Trial - Free Press Standards, 54 A.B.A.J. 343, 345 (1968).
See id. at 347-51 for the text of the "Minimum Standards" adopted by the House of
Delegates, i.e., the "Reardon Report."
240. ABA LEGAL ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, AN INFORMA-
TION MANUAL FOR THE BAR, NEWS MEDIA, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS AND COURTS
(1969). See also Devitt, An Appeal for COOPERATION ON THE FAIR TRIAL - FREE PRESS
ISSUE, 22 OKLA. L. REV. 155 (1967). Judge Devitt, Chief Judge of the U.S. District
Court in Minnesota, succeeded Judge Reardon as chairman of the ABA Advisory Com-
mittee.
241. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1968, at 1, col. 5.
242. ABA LEGAL ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, FAIR TRIAL/
FREE PRESS VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS (1974). "Assembled in this Handbook is infor-
mation on the content of [23] agreements; what they seek to accomplish; how they have
worked; what is being done through continuing education to sustain and broaden the
gains made. Full texts of a representative sampling of existing agreements are repro-
duced." Id. at 1.
243. State Bar of California, Press Statement by John H. Finger, President (Feb. 29,
1968). "[Tlhe State Bar is a constitutional agency of the State of California and is in
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with the Media was appointed by the Bar to work toward this goal
with the California Freedom of Information Committee (representing
the state's working press). Joining in discussions were a committee of
the Conference of California Judges and, as observers, special repre-
sentatives of the Judicial Council of California.
After some twenty months of negotiations a "Joint Declaration
Regarding News Coverage of Criminal Proceedings in California" was
approved for submission to bench, bar and media organizations. By
February 15, 1970, the statement had been approved by six statewide
groups.2 " The Judicial Council, rulemaking body of the California
court system, gave the Joint Declaration official recognition in May
1970 by amending court administrative rules and calling on presiding
judges of superior and municipal courts to meet, when appropriate,
with committees of the bar and news media "to promote understanding
of the principles of fair trial and free press."215
The Joint Declaration incorporates a series of guiding principles
but has no enforcement or disciplinary force. It reflects the "spirit" of
Reardon but leaves decisions about what to publish or broadcast to
individual editors. Paragraph 9 calls for establishment of local bench-
bar-media committees to promote understanding of mutual problems,
and to this end committees have been established in nine of the more
populous counties of the state. 2 40
The Joint Declaration was aimed, inter alia, at reducing the number
of individual restrictive orders, which were said to have "mushroomed"
no way bound by an action or recommendation of the American Bar Association which
is a voluntary organization." Id.
244. State Bar of California, California Freedom of Information Committee, California
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, California Broadcasters Ass'n, Radio and TV News Di-
rectors, and (the Executive Board of) the Conference of California Judges. For a dis-
cussion of the Joint Declaration see A. PICKERELL & M. LIPMAN, THE COURTS AND THE
NEWS MEDIA 86-89 (1974).
245. Kleps, News Coverage of Criminal Proceedings, 45 CAL. ST. B. J. 462 (1970).
However, a California appellate court has embraced the holding of Sheppard and taken
its cue from the Reardon Report. People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 184, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 265, 314 (1976) citing Maine v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 438 P.2d 372,
66 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1968).
246. Minutes, annual meeting of Statewide Joint Committee for Bench, Bar, Media
Committee (April 21, 1977) (on file in office of Department of Communications and
Public Affairs, State Bar of California).
247. Judge Alarcon agreed that many gag orders are unnecessary: "A lot of gag
orders have been issued as a result of what you might call panic. I'm referring to the
stupid ones. But most orders have not been directed to the media. I do not know of
any order directed at the media that has been upheld by an appellate court. Most of
the orders are issued against the sheriff or the coroner or the police chief, excited by
the fact that a microphone is shoved into his face, and he's now a star. He's giving his
opinion about how he's caught the guilty one." 1974 APME REDBOOK, supra note 236,
at 63.
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in California following the dramatic issuance by Judge Arthur L.
Alacron of the "Order re Publicity" in the Sirhan case.24 7 The Sirhan
order was modeled after the Reardon recommendations and the United
States Supreme Court denied review of its propriety.248
Earlier, the state court of appeals had held that the superior court
was without jurisdiction to issue a comprehensive injunction modeled
after the Reardon recommendations. The appellate court had placed
the burden on each defendant to establish affirmatively that he would
be deprived of a fair trial, since such broad restrictions could not be
laid down as a general rule.24.
Issuance of restrictive orders occurred nationwide, the Associated
Press Managing Editors Association reporting that between 1970 and
1975 some two hundred such orders had been issued in various federal
or state courts. 25 0 Most orders were of the "Reardon type," principally
restricting attorneys and law enforcement officials; but sometimes
parties and/or public officials were included as well. 25 1 Several took
the form of direct restraint against the press, but as Judge Alarcon
noted these almost invariably were disapproved by appellate courts
as a form of prior restraint.2 12
Concurrent with the increase in restrictive orders was greater use
of subpoenas seeking evidentiary testimony from newsmen. In the past,
the press and prosecuting officials (both state and federal) seem to
have co-existed in an uncertain situation, and only occasionally had
248. 393 U.S. 1001 (1968). See Younger, Fair Trial and Free Press and the Man
in the Middle, 56 A.B.A.J. 127 (1970), protesting the effect of the restrictive order
on him as prosecutor. It was charged that protective orders were "routinely issued in
virtually all cases having sufficient public interest to command significant news cover-
age . . . ." Warren & Abell, Free Press - Fair Trial: The "Gag Order," A California Aber-
ration, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 62 (1972). "[T~he California judiciary has succeeded
in achieving a degree of control over the publication of news respecting criminal justice
virtually co-equal to that enjoyed by the British Bench." Warren, Examining the Ero-
sion of a Basic Human Freedom, BULL. AM. Soc'v NEWSPAPER EDITORs, Feb. 1973, at 3.
249. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. App. 2d 670, 62 Cal. Rptr.
435 (1967).
250. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMITTEE, Continuing Study Report, 1975 APME
REDBOOK 202, 206. Schmidt, A New Wave of Gag Orders, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
33, Nov.-Dec., 1975).
251. See, e.g., "Order re Publicity," People v. Sirhan, No. A 233 421 (Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, June 7, 1968). In Sirhan, after public statements by the Mayor
of Los Angeles respecting incriminating notebook entries reportedly made by the ac-
cused, Judge Alarcon ordered all parties to the action, including "any public officials,"
to refrain from extra-judicial statements. Id.
252. In California, prior restraint orders were struck down twice by courts of ap-
peal in Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1973) and
Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973).
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there been a problem.2,3 Apparently, there had been more de facto
recognition of a newsman's traditional "privilege," with the govern-
ment turning to the press only as a last resort.2 4 However, in the late
1960's a combination of circumstances brought an increase in sub-
poenas issued to newsmen. The government basically justified such
procedure by pointing to the dangerous activities of which newsmen
had knowledge.2" Reporters and their attorneys argued that the prac-
tice reflected laziness on the part of law enforcement." The danger
of the media becoming identified as "an investigative arm of the gov-
ernment" was also stressed.2 57 Law enforcement officials had come to
realize that news reporters were often readily-available observers of
activities in which investigatory agencies were highly interested. The
development of more in-depth, specialized, reporting had resulted in
journalists with expertise in new social problems; many of the news-
men's privileged incidents involved contact with dissident, sometimes
militant, groups. Frustrated by the increase in crime and the com-
plexity of the issues, law enforcement had followed a policy of seeking
any sort of available evidence.
In the two-year period 1969-70, a total of one hundred and sixty-
six subpoenas was reported as having been directed against the three
television networks, requesting news reporters' notes or television
253. Newsmen have traditionally refused to divulge the sources of their information
even under threat of fine and incarceration. Canon 5 of the Code of Ethics, adopted in
1934, provided that "newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose
sources of confidential information in court or before other judicial or investigative
bodies." Brandenburg, Newspaper Guild Adopts Ethics Code, EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
June 16, 1934, at 7, 41. One study reports finding only two cases in which a reporter
identified a confidential source after being cited for contempt. Sytsma, McKirdy, & Brod-
beck, Comments, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg v. Hayes: Whither Now?
J. Cium. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 218, 231 (1973), citing In re Wayne, 4 Haw. Dst. Ct. 475
(1914); and Eddie Barr (unreported), N.Y. Times, March 13, 1931, at 25, col. 8.
254. Between 1911 and 1968 there were only 17 reported cases of legal compulsion
of the press and only six of these involved governmental subpoena. The Newsman's
Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58
CALIF. L. REV. 1198, 1200 nn.9 & 10 (1970). The Chief of Police of Los Angeles, Tom
Redden, explained in an interview in 1968 that officials usually had other sources, and
rarely found it necessary to turn to the press and did so with "the greatest reluctance."
Id. at 1201 n.12.
255. See, e.g., Text of Mitchell Statement About Press, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1970, at
40, col. 4.
256. See Lawyer Hits Lazy Officials for Seeking Reporters' Help, EDITOR & PUB-
LISHER, March 7, 1970, at 15.
257. CBS News President Richard S. Salant complained: "People are going to duck
when we come around because they'll think we are arms of the government. Our sources
will dry up." Reporting for Court Duty, TiME-s, Feb. 9, 1970, at 52. An attorney who
represented several news organizations commented: "We've become an information
service for everybody who's in court." Id.
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tapes. 258 The 1971 annual report of the Freedom of Information Com-
mittee of the American Society of Newspaper Editors charged that the
use of subpoenas against newsmen had reached "epidemic propor-
tions."259 In February, 1973, the editor of the Los Angeles Times testi-
fied that in the previous few years the Times had been served with
thirty subpoenas and threatened with fifty others. 2 0 The Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force report, published in 1976, commented on
"the excessive use of restrictive orders . . . issued too frequently and in
terms disproportionate to any realistic assessment of the peril they are
intended to prevent. "2' Legal costs involved in challenging a sub-
poena, it was asserted, were high enough to produce a "chilling effect,"
especially on smaller newspapers, and make them more vulnerable to
governmental pressure. 20 2
Discussions concerning the issuance and implementation of restric-
tive orders generally concentrated on the substance of the directive,
with relatively little attention paid to the procedure by which such
orders were developed and promulgated. One of the arguments by the
petitioners in the Fresno Four case was that the protective and sealing
orders had been issued without the newsmen being given notice of
or an opportunity to be heard at the hearing and that the orders were
therefore invalid.2' The California Court of Appeal, noting that the
newsmen were not named in the orders, held that the press had no
right to be notified or be present when such orders were being con-
sidered.26 4 This holding was in accord with the common law, for there
is little precedent for such standing by the press or for a right of access
258. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 36, at 558.
259. American Society of Newspaper Editors, 1971 PROB. IN JoURNALISM 34. In the
1969-70 period the Chicago Daily News and Chicago Sun-Times were said to have re-
ceived 30 subpoenas (largely related to the trouble-ridden Democratic National Con-
vention), two-thirds of them on behalf of the government. 1973 House Hearings, supra
note 36, at 485.
260. 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 36, at 282 (Statement of William F. Thomas).
L.A. Times, June 21, 1973, § 2, at 19, col. 1. He testified that the newspaper had spent
more than $200,000 in the past few years - "the vast bulk of it in the past year" -
defending itself against subpoenas. Id.
261. Shield Bills Still Lack Solid Support, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, May 10, 1975, at 16.
262. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUSTICE, PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT at 4-5 (1976).
263. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 207, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
264.. Id. at 208, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 439, citing Allegrezza v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.
App. 3d 948, 121 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1975), in which the appellate court ordered a closed
hearing to consider the suppression of an allegedly coerced confession. The court com-
mented: "In the context of this case the rights of the press are no greater than the rights
of the public generally. And the public generally has no right to pre-trial disclosure of
questionable evidence, a disclosure which might well deny to the accused the fair and
impartial trial which is his due." Id. at 951, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
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to such hearings.2 The courts had rather uniformly treated any kind
of restrictive order as outside the procedural requirements generally
applicable to the issuance of restraining orders and injunctions. 20 1
The American Bar Association, after hearing arguments that much
of the "hostility, acrimony and litigation" involved in challenging the
substance of restrictive orders would be avoided if an established pro-
cedure were followed, drafted (in mid-1974) a proposed procedure
which it circulated widely for comment.2 67 A considerable wave of
negative press reaction developed.2* The principal objection was that
it "institutionalized" an essentially unconstitutional procedure. 20 9
As a result of special hearings in which media representatives par-
ticipated, several modifications were made to the original draft. Major
changes included adoption of recommendations against the issuance
of any order that would impose direct restraint on the press and a
recommendation that the test for entry of a restrictive order should
be "applicable constitutional standards" rather than "reasonable likeli-
hood." 2 7 0 The American Society of Newspaper Editors still resisted the
265. A Reporters Committee study in 1972 revealed that in no single case litigated
by the media was a restrictive order upheld on its merits or was there any semblance
of a procedural process or notice to the public or press in advance of the restrictive
order's being entered. Landau, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process Proposal, 62
A.B.A.J. 55, 59 (1976).
266. However, the need for due process in the granting of restrictive orders was later
recognized by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd circuit in a 7-2 holding that the
press was entitled to some type of notice and hearing before entry of an order. United
States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
267. ABA COURT PROCEDURES, supra note 9, at 2.
268. See, e.g., Arnold, Editors Debate Reactions to Court 'Gag' Orders, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 16, 1975, at 8, col. 1; Guidelines on Court Coverage Assailed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25,
1975, at 27, col. 3; Hill, Cool Reception Given to ABA's "Gag" Guides, EDITOR & Pun-
LISHER, Nov. 1, 1975, at 13. The American Newspaper Publishers Association took the
position that rather than endorse such guidelines it "preferred to rely for protection on
the First Amendment and on existing court decisions." ANPA, GEN. BULL., Oct. 29,
1975, at 244.
269. "The press would not want to be in a position of tacitly accepting a court finding
which it thought unconstitutional, just because press representatives had negotiated
ground rules or attended procedural discussions." Hornby, An Imaginative Trial Balloon
for "Gag" Orders, BULL. AM. Soc'v NEWSPAPER EDITORS, Oct. 1974, at 16. Communi-
cations lawyers and most journalists reject any procedure, no matter how fair, which
sanctifies prior restraint. For example, James C. Goodale, in an appearance before the
ABA Advisory Committee on October 24 said: "The constitutional guarantees of a free
press are not served merely by taking away those guarantees through a procedure which
is fair. Some guarantees of the free press cannot be taken away, regardless of the pro-
cedure." EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Nov. 1, 1975, at 12. See also Goodale, Prior Restraints,
Fair Trial - Free Press, COMMUNICATIONs LAW 25 (1975) (Practicing Law Institute,
1975); Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial: The Volcano Erupts, CURRENT HISTORY,
July-Aug. 1976, at 19.
270. Comparison of preliminary draft of July 1975 and final draft of August 1976.
See also American Bar Ass'n, Press Release No. 120275, at 3-4 (Dec. 2, 1976).
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guidelines, however, on the grounds that in considering due process
in such situations the press "is not going to mousetrap itself into ac-
cepting automatic conviction."2 7 ' Further, although the revised pro-
cedures specifically recommended against the issuance of direct prior
restraints on the press, spokesmen for the media took the position (and
the advisory committee itself agreed) that the possibility that direct
restraint might be imposed still existed 272
The revised draft also placed greater emphasis on the need for
speedy appellate review, but did not accept media recommendations
for an "automatic stay of a contested order until it was reviewed on
appeal or provide for continuance of a criminal trial pending review
of the order."2 73 The ABA Advisory Committee rejected an automatic
stay because of concern about both the potential for trial delay and
the complexity of litigation involving orders generally considered only
peripheral to the criminal trial.274
After delaying final action pending the Nebraska litigation in the
U.S. Supreme Court275 the ABA House of Delegates in August, 1976,
concluding more than two years' consideration, adopted a set of rec-
ommended procedures.2 7 6
The approved ABA recommendations embody two forms of pro-
cedure: (1) adoption of standing guidelines, which would be continu-
271. Hornby, supra note 269, at 39.
272. Consoli, Lawyers Vote Approval of Gag Order Procedure, EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
Aug. 14, 1976, at 9.
273. ABA COURT PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 11, para. 10, Procedure for Entry of
Special Orders.
274. Roney, The Bar Answers the Challenge, 62 A.B.A.J. 60, 62 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Roney].
275. 427 U.S. 539.
276. Fair Trial - Free Press Resolution Adopted, 62 A.B.A.J. 1280 (1976). See also,
Goldstein, A.B.A. Urges Curb on Gag Procedures, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1976, at 46,
col. 1. Prior to the voice vote, the Advisory Committee expressed the view that the
Nebraska case, decided a few weeks earlier, "neither moots the need for the procedure
recommended nor indicates that the recommendations should be modified." In Nebraska,
a controversial restraint order before the United States Supreme Court waststruck down,
but free press - fair trial tensions were not really eased. The Court stopped short of
ruling out all prior restraint of the press but said nothing about orders restraining at-
torneys and law enforcement officials. In this context, commentators disagree as to Ne-
braska's probable effect. The most widely expressed view has been that the result will
be an increase in restrictive orders and closed trial proceedings. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11,
1976, at 46, col. 1. See, e.g., Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of
Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 469 (1977); Sack, Principle
and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 411, 427 (1977); Franklin,
Untested Assumptions and Unanswered Questions, 29 STAN. L. REv. 387, 391 (1977).
For an extensive treatment of the Nebraska case, the first United States Supreme Court
consideration of whether a trial court could constitutionally prohibit publication in ad-
vance of a trial to assure its fairness, see Symposium: Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REv. 383-626.(1977).
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ally in force and generally apply to all criminal proceedings. They
would establish normal standards of conduct for disclosure of informa-
tion and would not be enforceable by contempt citations. The standing
guidelines would address the areas covered by the Reardon report.2 7 ,
(2) Adoption of special orders, which would be reserved for specific
cases in which it was found that "potential prejudicial publicity posed
such a substantial threat to a fair trial as to justify use of the court's
contempt power, within the boundaries of constitutional and other
substantive standards applicable in the jurisdiction." Special orders
would be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case. Violations
would be enforceable by contempt.27 8
The reasoning behind this two-fold approach is that standing orders
of general application are largely ignored in cases of little public in-
terest, whereas when a sensational trial occurs there is general con-
fusion as to whether the standing order will be enforced and what
parts of such order apply to the particular case. This approach is based
on the concept that, with a special order tailored to specific circum-
stances, this potential area of misunderstanding and conflict would be
eliminated. In the meantime, standing guidelines would serve to
establish the normal standards of conduct.2 7 9
The adopted procedures recommend that a judge: (1) give notice
to the public and press when access-restricting orders are being con-
sidered; (2) permit written objections be filed by a specified date;
(3) if objections are filed, hold an informal or evidentiary hearing at
which interested persons may appear with or without counsel and
without conceding personal jurisdiction of the court; and (4) provide
for appellate review, forthwith, in the most expeditious manner pro-
vided by the particular jurisdiction for review of temporary injunctive
orders or any other orders subject to expedited review.28 0
277. The Committee considered that Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d
242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976), faulting the constitutionality
of district court rules patterned to some extent after Reardon, dealt with substantive
requirements. Thus, the ultimate outcome of that litigation would have no effect on a
favorable consideration of the recommended procedure. Roney, supra note 274, at 61.
278. ABA CounT PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 5.
279. Id.
280. On the federal level, a Senate subcommittee report calls for guidelines limiting
issuance of restrictive orders by federal courts and the closure of judicial proceedings.
The study takes the view that Nebraska Press Association only increases the necessity
of resolving the free press/fair trial dilemma in that the Supreme Court did not con-
front the issue of closed proceedings nor did it address the problems raised by issuance
of restrictive orders on trial participants. The subcommittee recommendations would
prohibit restrictive orders on trial participants unless the extrajudicial statements would
constitute a "serious and imminent threat to the fair administration of justice." A pro-
posed three-pronged test would require that the judge find probable cause to believe
CoNi/ErNr [Vol. I146
Newspaper attorneys argued that the ABA proposal, in the wake
of the Nebraska case, would tend to encourage the use of restrictive
orders. Floyd Abrams, a member of the ABA Standing Committee on
Communications who has often represented the New York Times and
who appeared before the ABA committee on behalf of NBC, said the
procedures would lead to "more confusion, more litigation and more
gag orders."2'1 Conversely, the chairman of the ABA Advisory Com-
mittee, Paul H. Roney, a federal circuit judge, argued the new pro-
cedures would discourage the issuance of restrictive orders. The ABA
resolution could, he maintained, be a "sunshine law for the courts."282
The committee attempted to meet the "proliferation" fears by stressing
that it did "not intend to recommend or encourage the use of restric-
tive orders and that it regarded as preferable the alternatives suggested
in the Reardon report and by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sheppard .283
Judge Roney commented that the committee's proposed procedural
framework "offers a fair, pragmatic and much-needed means of mini-
mizing the impact caused by the inevitable constitutional collision of
two precious rights. The procedure can be refined in the crucible of
everyday experience in the courtrooms across the country." 284 But
Judge Harold R. Medina expressed disapproval of the ABA procedures,
issuing a rallying cry to the press "to fight like tigers every inch of the
way." He urged the media to make no compromises and no conces-
sions of any kind. 85 He told a newspaper publishers convention (to a
standing ovation) that he had made a "great mistake" in 1967 in sup-
porting voluntary guidelines: "[T]he courts get ahold of these guide-
the prejudicial material would reach jurors or probable jurors, would create an imper-
missible level of prejudice, and that alternative safeguards against prejudicial publicity
would not suffice. Procedural provisions mandate that before a judge can issue a re-
strictive order, seal any document or close any proceedings (whether at the pretrial
level or during the trial itself) a hearing must be held in which the press would be
accorded standing to litigate the propriety of such an order. STAFF OF SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Free Press - Fair Trial 7-13 (Comm. Print
1976).
281. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1976, 46 at col. 1. See also PRESS CENSORSHIP NEWS-
LETTER (Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press), Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 35.
282. Id. Judge Roney described the proposed procedures as a compromise between
two poles - the judge who says "nobody is going to tell me how to run my court-
house . . . and persons in the media who take the position there is absolutely no kind
of order that a court can ever enter that will have any effect on the news media ac-
cess .... 1975 APME REDBOOK, supra note 250, at 38-39.
283. ABA COURT PROCEDURE, supra note 9, at 7.
284. Roney, supra note 274, at 63. For speculation that the ABA procedures would
reduce "the current glut" of restrictive orders, see Commentary, Applying Due Process
to Gag Rules and Orders, 55 NEB. L. REV. 427 (1976).
285. Medina, The Press Should "Fight Like Tigers," A Judge's View, BULL. AM.
Soc'y NEWSPAPER EDITORS, Jan. 1973, at 6.
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lines and the first thing you know it is rolled out into a piece of concrete
as hard as a rock, and there is nothing voluntary about it and there
are no exceptions to it and you are stuck."286
Opponents of the proposal saw participation by the media in such
hearings as having other negative connotations, citing the fact that
the source for news about pending court cases is often the very indi-
vidual(s) that restrictive orders seek to bar from talking to the press.
Their view is that if the press, in effect, participates in drafting a
restrictive order - even by suggesting to the court that no order should
be entered - it is questionable whether the press can avoid being
legally or morally bound not to print information gathered from parties
directly bound by the order. Abrams puts the problem thusly: "Would
not an appearance by the press with respect to the entry of a Special
Order be taken by the courts as at least a kind of promise to abide by
the order as if it were bound by it?"2m7 Reasoning further along these
lines, some newspaper attorneys who earlier favored press participation
in a hearing on issuance of a restrictive order have modified their po-
sition and now express strong reservations. They might participate in
such a procedure if they felt they would have any real influence, they
explain, but believe that too often the judge would be holding a "win-
dow dressing," pro forma hearing to discuss the contents and reasons
for an order he had made up his mind to issue.2 88
One authority argues that so long as prior restraints are possible,
depending on the circumstances, it follows that short-term restraining
orders can be issued whenever a plausible claim of special circum-
stances can be made s Concern also has been expressed that some
trial judges might issue prior restraint orders together with findings
that the Sheppard alternatives are inadequate. 29 0 A hint of such ap-
proach is found in a California trial judge's report that the list of Shep-
pard "palliatives" was treated with "amazement, anger or laughter" by
286. Williamson, Judge Medina Cheered by Publishers at ANPA, EDITOR & PUB-
LISHER, May 8, 1976, at 82. Judge Medina served as chairman of a Special Committee
on Radio, Television, and the Administration of Justice of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York. The "Medina Report" (titled Freedom of the Press and Fair
Trial) was generally more conciliatory toward the press than was Reardon.
287. Statement submitted to ABA Legal Advisory Comm. on Fair Trial and Free
Press (mimeographed copy in files of author, School of Journalism, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley).
288. As reported by Robert S. Warren, Los Angeles attorney who has frequently
represented the L.A. Times (telephone interview with Robert S. Warren, Feb. 9, 1977).
289. Schmidt, supra note 276, at 469; see also, Schmidt, The Nebraska Decision,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 51, 53.
290. Schmidt, supra note 276, at 470.
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trial judges attending sessions of the National College of the State
Judiciary.219
The essential purpose of the ABA procedure, Judge Roney has ex-
plained, is to assist a judge who is confronted with a fair trial-free
press situation in two ways: (1) to permit the judge to explore the
various measures that may be taken to assure a fair trial, and (2) to
provide a full amplification of the first amendment ramifications of any
action that would effectively restrict the flow of information to the
public.2 Judge Roney saw the procedure as encouraging judges to
deal with problems in the fair trial-free press areas as far in advance
as possible, thus minimizing "those last-minute decisions that have to
be made in an emotionally charged atmosphere. . . ."20.3
A recent experimental variation of the ABA recommendations was
adopted by a Fresno County Superior Court judge in appointing a
three-member citizens' committee to advise him concerning sealing of
a grand-jury transcript in a multiple-murder case.2 4 The committee,
appointed at the request of attorneys for The Fresno Bee, consisted of
representatives of the press, the public, and the legal profession. Judge
Kenneth Andreen instructed the committee to evaluate the requested
protective order in accordance with a "reasonable likelihood" standard.
He emphasized he would not necessarily be bound by its findings:
It is probable that no procedure can be adopted for all cases and
all circumstances. It may be that the court will ultimately adopt
procedures quite different from those chosen today. The attempt
291. Younger, The Sheppard Mandate Today: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 56 NEB.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1977); see also Younger, Some Thoughts on the Defense of Publicity
Cases, 29 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1977). The inadequacy of the Sheppard "devices" is also
discussed in Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free Press: An Opportunity for Coexistance, 29
STAN. L. REV. 561, 561-67 (1977).
292. Roney, supra note 274, at 62.
293. Id. A "hot line" procedure developed by the California Judges Association seeks
to achieve the same objectives through a different approach. Recognizing that when a
criminal case generating massive publicity occurs there is little time to do adequate
research, the Public Information Committee of the Association offers a new service on
an informal basis. A judge asked to issue a restrictive or gag order is able to discuss
the matter with a judge who has been through the same situation, including the judges
who were involved in the Sirhan (Judge Arthur L. Alarcon of Los Angeles County Su-
perior Court) and Angela Davis (Judge Richard E. Arnason of Contra Costa County
Superior Court) cases. In the March 1975 issue of the Association's monthly journal
there appeared the names and telephone numbers (both home and office) of five judges.
The procedure was explained thusly: "The calling judge will simply be able to discuss
the facts, to ask questions, to talk about alternatives. He won't be told what to do,
experience will be shared. This can be done confidentially; no discussion of its after-
wards by the judge called . . . Don't wait until you have only 20 minutes to announce
your decision . . . try the HOT LINE!" Fretz, Try the HOTLINEl CAL. CTS. COM-
MENTARY, March 1975, at 2.
294. People v. Garcia, No. 29261 (Superior Court of Fresno County Oct. 31, 1975).
149No. 1] SHIELD LAWS AND SUBPOENAS
made here is by one judge in a single case. It is obvious to him
that the press and the courts face a period of experimentation and
dialogue before procedures can be refined.2";
The Advisory Committee recommended - and Judge Andreen con-
curred - that only ten lines of the 350-page grand jury transcript be
sealed.211 A defendant's petition for writ of prohibition was denied by
the court of appeal on the ground that the issue was moot. The ap-
pellate court stated, however, that it was not passing "on the validity
of the respondent's order appointing a citizen committee to be given
access to a sealed grand jury transcript and to exercise part of the
judicial function; this order should not be construed to sanction such
a procedure." 29 7
In April 1977, the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California
accepted recommendations of its Committee to Confer with the Media,
and rejected the ABA proposals2 " and at the same time reaffirmed
support of the Joint Declaration, which it had adopted in 1970.219 The
committee had concluded that approval of the ABA procedures "would
undo much of the constructive work that had been accomplished by
the Joint Declaration."00 The Board voted at the same time to elevate
the committee from a special group to a standing committee.3 0
Restrictive orders contribute to the prospect of a trial judge facing
the ordeal of incarcerating a newsman who probably is acting in good
faith. The trial judge can anticipate that his order will be subject to
rigorous appellate review and that highly competent counsel will
promptly file petitions and briefs in support of the newsman.30 2 The
295. Id. at 4.
296. Id. at 3.
297. Garcia v. Superior Court, No. 2788 (5th D. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1975).
298. The Recorder (San Francisco), April 15, 1977, at 1, col. 5. See also, Dep't of
Communications and Public Affairs, State Bar of California News Release, April 15,
1977.
299. See supra notes 243-48.
300. Letter to Board of Governors of California State Bar from J. Hart Clinton,
Chairman of State Bar Committee to Confer with the Media (Nov. 18, 1975).
301. Earlier, in January 1976, the Board of Governors had voted unanimously not
to approve a preliminary draft of the ABA procedures, citing "the imminence of a
United States Supreme Court decision concerning this subject matter" (referring to the
then-pending Nebraska Press Association case). Mirutes, Board of Governors Meeting,
January 22-24, 1976. The appropriate branch of government to issue such guidelines,
in the view of state Attorney General Evelle Younger, is the legislature, not the courts.
It is unrealistic, he asserted, to expect judges to establish rules that may diminish what
they believe is their "'inherent power' to control proceedings before them." L.A. Times,
Nov. 6, 1976, § 2, at 7, col. 1.
302. Eight amicus briefs were filed in the Fresno Four case, representing the views
of every major news organization in the country.
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judge may be faced with a situation for which the "weaponry of judicial
power [contempt] is ill-designed."303
The determination whether to issue a restrictive order must take
many uncertain factors into consideration. If a trial judge fails to grant
a requested order he runs the risk of spending weeks or months try-
ing a case that may be doomed to be reversed, should it result in a
conviction.
Where, on the eve of a trial involving sensational multiple murders,
the court is informed that there are prospects of publication of an al-
leged confession or prior criminal record which will make a fair trial
"impossible," the problem facing the trial judge has been described
as follows by a California court:
Usually judges are faced with the question whether to issue a
protective order at a very early stage in a criminal prosecution.
Many of the factors which militate in favor of such an order can
only be dimly perceived. The judge may, of course, have a vague
idea about the case's potential as a trigger for prejudicial news. He
probably knows something about the seriousness of the crime, the
character, prominence or notoriety of the principals, and can guess
at the newsworthiness of the proceedings from whatever publicity
has already been engendered. That, however, is about it.3 04
Notwithstanding such problems, any "proliferation" of restrictive or-
ders in California appears to have ceased. Whereas there was once
what is described as a "gag order fad,"30 5 the rarity of current "pub-
licity cases" is described by one jurist as "striking."30(o Another has
speculated that restrictive orders "may be headed for the same fate
that befell the dinosaurs at the onset of the ice age."30 7 The resolution
of the House of Delegates of the State Bar, which condemns the jailing
of the Fresno Four,30 was seen as evidencing the disfavor with which
protective orders are viewed. "If the lawyers of this state won't stand
behind enforcing a court order, then can it be long before a judge
303. Younger, supra note 291, at 5.
304. 30 Cal. App. 3d, at 159-60, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
305. Younger, supra note 291, at 1.
306. Id. at 2. Los Angeles County, with some 350 trial judges of municipal, superior,
and federal district courts, has been seen as producing far more than its proportional
share of publicity cases. However, according to Judge Younger, there were no more
than five such cases during 1976. Each trial judge has about one chance in 70 of
handling a "publicity case" in a given year. Thus the average judge will never handle
such a case. Id.
307. Hanscom, Gag Orders Facing Extinction?, CAL. CTS. COMMENTARY, Jan. 1977,
at 4.
308. Transcript, Proceedings of the 42nd annual meeting of the Conference of Dele-
gates, State Bar of California, Sept. 18, 1976.
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will have to do much soul searching before issuing such an order?"30
A further indication of recognition of restrictive orders as an ineffective
tool is provided by the recent Oregon judicial Conference resolution
condemning court orders to protect persons charged with crime.310
VII. Conclusion
Both the defense and prosecution now seem to believe that open
discussion may not be as harmful as was formerly believed."I The
U.S. Supreme Court, in Murphy v. Florida, held that extensive pub-
licity and knowledge of the case by sitting jurors was not fatal to a
conviction," and the California Court of Appeal, in confirming the
Manson conviction, ruled that the fact a case had received enormous
publicity did not by itself establish error."' Angela Davis, Maurice
Stans, John Mitchell, John Connally, Sonny Carson and other cele-
brated defendants were acquitted in the face of widespread publicity.
On occasion the courts seem to strive for too sterile an atmosphere,
seeking a form of unrealistic purity. Judges, one constitutional authority
asserts, "must give up the notion that a trial can be isolated from the
outside world."31" Some adjustment needs to be made in recognition
of the pervasiveness of our modern communications system and the
specific factors of a particular case.3 1"
The Supreme Court's recognition in Nebraska of the categorical
right of the press to report what transpires in open court may en-
courage courts to close pretrial criminal proceedings (such as suppres-
sion hearings).3ic The greater the incidence of restrictive orders and
closed proceedings, the more oportunities are provided for violations
309. Hanscom, supra note 307, at 4.
310. Gag Orders Blasted, S.F. Chronicle, April 22, 1977, at 28, col. 1.
311. Hanscom, supra note 307, at 4.
312. 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975).
313. 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 184-88, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 314-17.
314. Barrett, Convention '76: Exploring Gag Orders, Shield Legislation, CAL. CTS.
COMMENTARY 1976, at 3.
315. For example, on the change of venue issue, removal of a highly-publicized case
to a small outside community could tend to focus the spotlight even more brightly upon
the case. "A metropolitan setting with its diverse population tends to blunt the pene-
trating effect of publicity." 61 Cal. App. 3d at 190, Cal. Rptr. at 318.
316. This issue was presented in the Chowchilla mass kidnap case in which the de-
fendants moved to conduct an in camera hearing on a motion to suppress evidence
(estimated to take a month). The superior court ruled against closing the hearing, and
the First District Court of Appeal affirmed, denying defendants' motion for a writ of
mandate. Three newspapers and the California Newspaper Publishers Association had
successfully moved to intervene and had argued in opposition to the defendants' motion
to suppress evidence. People v. Woods, Nos. 63187A, B, and C (Superior Court of
Alameda County 1977).
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leading to disciplinary proceedings against newsmen - ending in the
classic kind of confrontation encountered in the Farr and Fresno Four
cases.
Trial judges will continue to regard themselves as under a Shep-
pard mandate. The problem is to avoid the issuance of routine or un-
necessary orders which are almost certain to perpetuate, if not inten-
sify, a hostility that is damaging to both the courts and the press.3'
The sound and fury of the dialogue surrounding the law and the
media has been described as reaching an "alarming and discordant
crescendo," as the courts, journalists caustically comment, arrogate to
themselves "the role of both participants and umpire."I's
No responsible journalist wants to jeopardize a judicial proceeding.
And no judge or attorney should seek to impose undue restraints, di-
rectly or indirectly, upon a free press. In the past decade, largely as a
result of voluntary agreements and various forms of dialogue, the press
has achieved a greater degree of self-restraint and has generally demon-
strated more concern for the problems of a fair trial.319 In a parallel
development, the courts have shown increased sensitivity to the prac-
tical problems of the press and overall have a "more temperate
mood."3 2 0 But the tension is still high and further steps need to be
taken. Significantly, it would appear, the American Bar Association
held a public hearing on August 9, 1977, on "updating and revising"
its Minimum Standards (Reardon Report). The Committee has under
consideration a draft that would retain the present standards, but add
a new standard governing procedural requirements in the issuance of
judicial restrictive orders. Under this draft, notice to the media would
be a prerequisite before any order could be issued that would restrict
317. See text accompanying notes 232-37 supra. One trial judge recently explained:
"It is difficult for the press to understand that a frank acknowledgment by a trial judge
that a Supreme Court opinion seems unwise does not entitle the trial judge to have
his way .... See Younger supra note 291, at 13. In Sheppard, twice in one paragraph
the United States Supreme Court stressed that the trial judge must (even sua sponte)
take steps to protect the trial against prejudicial outside influences. Further, it held
"the [trial] court should have made some effort to control the release of leads, infor-
mation, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses and the counsel for both
sides." 384 U.S. at 357, 359 (1966).
318. Preface to THE MEDIA AND THE LAW (J. Califano & H. Simmons eds. 1976),
providing the transcript of the Washington Conference on the Media held at the Home-
stead in Virginia (sponsored by the Washington Post and the Ford Foundation). One
seminar observer, Charles Seib, Washington Post ombudsman, wrote: "The press and
the law confronted each other in the Virginia mountains a few weeks ago. It was
eyeball-to-eyeball and sometimes claw-to-claw. Both sides survived with convictions and
prejudices intact for the most part, but with sensitivities raised." Id. at ix.
319. Lewis, Cantankerous, Obstinate, Ubiquitous: The Press, 1975 UTAH L. REV.
75, 85-86 (1975).
320. D. FRETz, THE COURTS AND THE COMMUNITY 21 (1973).
No. 11 SHIELD LAWS AND SUBPOENAS 153
extrajudicial comment by attorneys and parties or that would close any
judicial proceeding."'
The National Press Council, on the theory that voluntary guidelines
have been "undermined and discredited" and that "tensions and anxie-
ties" were likely to be greatly heightened by implementation of the
ABA procedures, has called for "some means other than new guidelines
and procedures burdened with a coercive stigma. . . .".2 The council
has recommended establishment of a joint committee consisting of
equal members of the organized bar and journalists to examine prac-
tices involving free press/fair trial. An annual report would be made
on the performance of the press and judiciary in an effort to encourage
higher standards of judicial and journalistic conduct in the fair trial
area. The report would cite "specific examples" and cases histories of
successes and abuses in the coverage of court proceedings.3 23 The goal
of the committee would be to "regain the good faith and mutual trust
which have been eroded by restrictive orders and strident editorials."12 1
A recent move by the combined American Newspaper Publishers
Association and American Bar Association partially implements the
National Press Council's recommendation. A joint task force has been
announced (five each from the ANPA and the ABA) with the goal of
"helping each profession to understand the role of the other by pro-
viding structured dialogue concerning their common interest in pre-
serving the liberties of the American people."32 5
It seems unlikely that this particular task force will go so far as to
evaluate press and/or judicial performance.12 , American editors and
321. 2 MED. L. RPTR. 2233 (Aug. 23, 1977). Comments were invited from members
of the press, bar, and bench involved in the free press/fair trial conflict, American Bar
Association, Press Release, May 19, 1977.
322. National News Council, Free Press and Fair Trial, A Proposal at 3 (Jan. 20,
1976) (mimeographed statement). The National News Council was formed in 1973
after a Twentieth Century Fund Task Force recommended the establishment of a na-
tional body to investigate public complaints about inaccurate and unfair reporting and
to defend the press. The Council chairman is Norman Isaacs, former editor of the
Louisville Courier-Journal and Times and one-time president of the American Society
of Newspaper Editors.
323. Id. at 4.
324. Id. at 6. One communications law authority has suggested establishing a Presi-
dential Commission on Free Press and Fair Trial to involve "thoughtful and expert
persons from outside the fields of law and journalism." The Presidential Commission
on Obscenity and Porndgraphy would be a model. Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial:
The Volcano Erupts, CURRENT HIsToRY, July-Aug. 1976, at 19, 33.
325. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, Press Release (March 16, 1977). See
also committee reports submitted at ANPA Convention, San Francisco, April 25-27,
1977, REPORT OF PREss/BAR RELATIONS COMMITTEE 46.
326. A limited precedent is provided by the complaint procedure of the New York
Fair Trial-Free Press Conference, which informally monitors the press for violation of
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publishers traditionally have opposed the press council idea, regarding
such agency as a "deceptive forerunner to some kind of government
overview of press functions."3 2  They take the view that the press
should be left to police itself and that any outside surveillance would
inevitably represent an encroachment on freedom of the media.-"'
Although the Council's sternest critics remain unmoved, the support
and cooperation received from the media has improved. During 1976
the National Press Council expanded its activities and announced that
it had sufficient pledges to finance the next three years.""
From various other sources have come expressions of the need for
mutual exchanges, such as conferences and dialogues. The American
Society of Newspaper Editors and the Ford Foundation have sponsored
a series of seminars,3 30 as have other organizations such as the Califor-
nia Judges' Association. The ABA's recommended court procedures
provide one further type of forum by allowing for media input in the
decision-making process involved in the issuance of guidelines or orders
governing the conduct of a trial. The procedures provide a mechanism
for reminding judges that "limitation of First Amendment freedoms
must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of
the particular governmental interest involved."33' Further, they could
conceivably avoid the kind of confrontation that resulted in a jail term
in the Fresno Four case.
If a well-motivated judge seeks consultation in determining wheth-
er there are factors that might constitute "reasonable likelihood" that
a trial would be prejudiced unless an order were issued, summary re-
fusal of the media to participate seems ill-advised; although it is true
that there is a hazard in participation since, as some newsmen inform-
ally express it, the ball game is in "their" park and with "their" rules.
However, the courts have done very well by the press in the past
guidelines. However, in the reports that are periodically issued, names and places are
changed and newspapers are not identified. See NEW YoRK FAIR TRIAL FREE PRESS
CONFERENCE PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES; RULES OF PROCEDURE 1974.
327. J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES: ETHICAL PROB3LEMS OF THE NEWS
MEDIA 238 (1976).
328. See What About Press Councils? EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Nov. 28, 1970, at 4. At
the time the National Press Council was formed, the N.Y. Times announced that it would
refuse to cooperate with council investigations of complaint cases. Shipler, Cooperation
Seen with Press Panel, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1973, § 1, at 60, col. 1.
329. UPI Reporter (United Press International, New York) Dec. 9, 1976.
330. See Preface to THE MEDIA AND THE LAW (J. Califano & H. Simmons eds. 1976).
In addition, the American Society of Newspaper Editors has sponsored a series of re-
gional "outreach" workshops. For a description of these conferences see Hornby, ASNE
Workshop Reaches Out with Socrates, BULL. Am. Soc'y NEWSPAPER EDITORS, Oct.
1976, at 10.
331. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
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half century, and a case can be made that the judiciary has been a more
vigilant protector of first amendment rights than either the executive
or the legislative branches of the government. 3 2 A judge who partici-
pated in one of the Ford Foundation seminars, after expressing shock
at the "animosity, the hostility, the suspicion, the resentment, the dis-
like and indeed the fear of the courts" among reporters and publishers,
commented:
Where ... do you think these great constitutional rights that you
were so vehemently asserting and in which you were so conspicu-
ously wallowing yesterday, where do you think they came from?
The stork didn't bring them. These came from the judges of this
country, from those villains sitting at this table. . . . They came be-
cause at some time or place, when some other agency of govern-
ment was trying to push the press around or indeed maybe trying
to do you in, it was the courts of this country that protected you.
And that's where these constitutional rights came from . . .3s
Both the press and judiciary must depend on public support.
Whether the press can maintain its legally-protected independence
depends, as Professor Edward L. Barret, Jr. has put it, "on its own fair-
ness and responsibility, on its ability to establish some form of public
accountability which will maintain its credibility."" The press makes
a mistake to argue its interests must always prevail.3 35 But likewise
the esteem and trust with which the judiciary is held will suffer if the
courts are conceived as exercising contempt powers in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. The news media have powerful vehicles of public
opinion at their command.
The problem will not be solved by resource to abstract principles
- be it "the defendant's right to a fair trial" or "the public's right to
know." The conflict is not between a Right and a Wrong, but between
two Rights.
Only calm, reflective effort by both sides can establish the mutual
respect and understanding that is essential if both institutions are to
effectively exercise their constitutional roles. There has been progress,
but tensions between the press and the courts remain. Still valid is the
observation a few years ago of a prominent federal judge: "[T]he day
of Armageddon has not yet dawned on this great conflict.""'
332. Califano, Shielding the Press, N'Ew REPUBLIC, May 5, 1973, at 21.
333. THE MEDIA AND THE LAW, supra note 330, at 12.
334. Barrett, Freedom of the Press, American Style, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY:
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED 214, 265 (H. Jones ed. 1976).
335. Lewis, Cantankerous, Obstinate, Ubiquitous: The Press 1975 UTAH L. REV. 75,
87.
336. United States v. Dickenson, 465 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1972) (Brown, C. J.),
aff'd on rehearing 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
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